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The Economics of Distinctiveness: The Road
to Monopolization in Trade Mark Law
P. SEAN MORRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

The debate on trade mark use would not be complete without a
foray into the economics of distinctiveness in trade marks. Trade mark
use is governed by statute in many jurisdictions, at the national level,
2
and also by international treaties. The protection of trade marks under
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) can be found in

* Emil Aaltonen Research Fellow, University of Helsinki. Part of this paper was presented at the
conference, Global IP and New Interfaces, Helsinki, Finland, April 16–17, 2010, and was
originally titled, The Law and Economics of Trademarks: Product Differentiation, Market Power
and New Directions in Antitrust. The author is grateful to the participants especially Annette Kur,
Max-Oker Blom, Onsgar Ohly and Katja Weckstrom for useful comments. The author is also
grateful to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review for their assistance with publishing this article.
1. In recent years, an insightful debate among some of the more eminent contemporary
trademark scholars occurred over the existence and scope of the trademark use requirement. See,
e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007); Uli Widmaier,
Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 604 (2004);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law,
92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons
from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark
Use and the Problem of Sources in Trademark Law, 101 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773–75 (2009); see
generally Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting
Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner of a Mark”, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2009)
(discussing the existence and scope of the use requirement in light of common law and the
Lanham Act).
2. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as
Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, and Washington on June 2, 1911, at the Hague on
November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm
on July 14, 1967, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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3

Articles 15–21. Under Article 15(1) of TRIPS, distinctiveness
reverberates as the sole substantive condition for the protection of a
4
trade mark. TRIPS provisions on trade marks can be found in the
national trade mark laws of many Member States of the WTO or
5
TRIPS-plus preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which adopt a
higher standard of protection of intellectual property rights than that
6
offered by TRIPS. The definition of trade marks under TRIPS is
similarly echoed in the European Union (EU), where applications can
7
be made for a Community trade mark (CTM). Under Article 4 of
Regulation No. 40/94, the Community Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR),
[a] Community trade mark may consist of any signs capable of being
represented graphically, particularly words, including personal
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their
packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
8
undertakings.

The consistent definition of a trade mark both in international,
regional, and national statutes tells us that trade marks are the same,
irrespective of geographic boundaries. In the Lanham Act, where
Section 1127 provides definitions, the term ‘mark’ includes any trade

3. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 15–21.
4. Article 15(1) of TRIPS describes trademarks as
[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of
constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular words including personal
names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of colours as well
as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as trademarks.
Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or
services. Members may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired
through use. Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be
visually perceptible.
For a comparative discussion on trademarks under TRIPS and other international agreements, see
generally Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International Protection of Trademarks after the TRIPS
Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 189 (1998); NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS
REGIME OF TRADEMARKS AND DESIGNS 99–262 (2d ed. 2011) (examining the new rules of
trademark protection under TRIPS as compared to the Paris Convention).
5. For recent discussion on TRIPS-plus, see generally Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling
Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and
Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 917 (2010) (examining
TRIPS-plus preferential trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region).
6. Id. at 927.
7. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1; amended
and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1
[hereinafter CTMR].
8. Id. art. 4.
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mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark, while the
term ‘trade mark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a
9
bona fide intention to use in commerce. Thus, a trade mark, according
to the Lanham Act, is used by a person in commerce to “identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
10
even if that source is unknown.”
Another key word in the definition section of the Lanham Act,
which is inextricably linked to trade marks, is the word ‘commerce.’
The definition of commerce includes “all commerce which may
11
lawfully be regulated by Congress.” Arguably, the best interpretation
12
of the Lanham Act, similar to TRIPS and the CTMR mentioned
above, is that it guarantees trade mark rights. Though the debate on
trade mark use focuses on the Lanham Act, which does not explicitly
13
mention trade mark use, the arguments in this article focus on the
doctrinal distinctiveness of trade marks, especially as developed in the
EU.

9. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) 15 U.S.C. § 1127 [2004]
[hereinafter Lanham Act].
10. Id.
11. Id. Lanham Act, section 1127 explains that the term “use in commerce” means:
[T]he bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be
deemed to be in use in commerce— (1) on goods when— (A) it is placed in any
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on
the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
replacement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their
sale, and (b) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and (2) on services
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services
are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or
in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is
engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
12. See CTMR, supra note 7.
13. See the discussions in Dogan and Lemley, supra note 1, at 1672, and Dinwoodie and
Janis, supra note 1, at 1609–18, on the varied interpretations of trade mark use in the Lanham
Act. See also Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006), which
states that
[s]ubject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an
injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is
likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark,
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.
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The legal regime for trade mark law in the EU is covered by the
14
15
harmonizing Trade Marks Directive and the CTMR. According to its
provisions, the Trade Marks Directive itself is not necessarily intended
to harmonize the trade mark laws of Member States in every aspect, but
rather just “those national provisions of law which most directly affect
16
the functioning of the internal market.” In Levi Strauss & Co. v.
17
Casucci SpA, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) said
that “the purpose of [the Trade Mark Directive] is generally to strike a
balance between the interest of the proprietor of a trade mark to
safeguard its essential function, on the one hand, and the interests of
other economic operators in having signs capable of denoting their
18
products and services.”
Here, it is possible to draw a direct comparison between the
“interests of economic operators” and those of monopolies. Regardless
of whether such a comparison affects the normal operating functions of
trade marks, the fundamental question that remains is whether the
distinctiveness of trade marks is one of the root causes of
monopolization in trade mark law.
This article hypothesizes that distinctiveness in trade mark law is a
source of monopolization, and consequently, the lens of antitrust law
should focus on whether the distinctiveness requirement is relevant in
modern trade mark use.
Part II of this article begins with a discussion of trade marks and
monopolies, establishing the framework for the rest of the article. Part II
also addresses the role of market power in trade marks within the
framework of antitrust law and suggests that the market power held by
trade marks presents problems for antitrust law.

14. See Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October
2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, O.J. (L 299) 25.
15. See CTMR, supra note 7.
16. Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, at 25.
17. The Treaty of Lisbon changed the name of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities to the Court of Justice of the European Union. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007,
2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, art 1(20)(1) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. The former Court of First
Instance was renamed the General Court and the supreme body is now called the Court of Justice
(ECJ). See id. In EU Law, the term Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) refers to the
two levels of jurisdiction taken together. See id; see also id. art. 1(2)(b) (“The Union shall be
founded on the present Treaty and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union . . .
Those two Treaties shall have the same legal value. The Union shall replace and succeed the
European Community.”).
18. Case C-145/05, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Casucci SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I-3717, ¶ 29.
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Part III offers a thorough discussion on the literature of the law and
economics of trade marks. This literature on the law and economics of
trade marks establishes the role trade marks play in the economic
activity of modern society and their commercial magnetism.
Part IV examines the main claim of the article, that the economics
of distinctiveness leads to monopolization. The section analyzes cases
before the ECJ and highlights the point of departure in how the court
treats distinctiveness.
Part V further develops the antitrust arguments briefly introduced
in Part II, and argues that trade marks’ exclusive rights preserve
monopoly rights in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 82 of the
19
EC Treaty).
Part VI then gives an analysis of the arguments in the previous
sections. Part VII concludes the article, asserting that distinctiveness is
key to transforming trade marks into monopolies.
II. MONOPOLIES AND TRADE MARKS
The argument that trade mark rights are monopolistic is not new.
What distinguishes the arguments in this article from others previously
made, however, is their focus on the need for both a new direction in
trade mark rights and the interpretation of such rights in the antitrust
20
jurisprudence of the ECJ. Although the majority of the ECJ’s cases
involve trade mark infringement, the Court only occasionally
acknowledges the monopoly aspect of trade marks. Even then, however,
the ECJ forgoes any concrete discussion of trade marks and the effects
of monopolies on competition law. For example, in Libertel Groep BV
v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, the ECJ held that an “extensive monopoly
[of trade marks] would be incompatible with a system of undistorted
competition, in particular because it could have the effect of creating an
19. On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty renamed the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (TEC), otherwise knows as the Rome Treaty, as the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 17; see also Consolidated Versions of
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 3,
2010, O.J. (C 83) [hereinafter TFEU]. Several articles, including the antitrust provisions, were
renumbered, and former Articles 81 and 82 of the TEC are now Articles 101 and 102 respectively
of the TFEU. See id. This article will use one or the other throughout, where appropriate.
20. In this article, the focus is on Article 102 of the TFEU and the case law of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ); relevant citations to the antitrust principles of Article 101 will also be
made, however. For similar arguments, see Charles R. Mandly, Jr., Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty
and Trademark Rights, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1314, 1320 (2003) (arguing that “[u]nlike other
intellectual property rights, trademarks may be perpetual, potentially lasting as long as does the
underlying goodwill.”).
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unjustified competitive advantage for a single trader.” This is not the
22
first time courts have associated trade marks with monopolies.
Previous decisions in the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States,
23
and other parts of Europe have made similar pronouncements. Those
courts, however, have failed to articulate the argument that trade marks
may constitute monopolies and, as such, may be a source of concern in
the context of antitrust law.
Cases that involve antitrust infringement both in Europe and the
rest of the world involve claims of anticompetitive practices by
24
dominant firms using market power or monopoly power. The
European Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant
Market (Relevant Market Notice) provided guidance on the possibility
25
of preventing the exercise of market power. The Relevant Market
Notice pointed to the relevant product market and geographic market
when determining the impact of an undertaking on competition law,
which comes about when “[a] relevant product market comprises all
those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or
26
substitutable by the consumer.”
The geographic market is a geographic area in which the market
power of an undertaking must be operating. The Relevant Market
Notice defines the relevant geographic market as comprising
the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the
supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions
of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be
distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of
27
competition are appreciably different in those area [sic].

The above provision suggests a degree of flexibility in interpreting the
relevant market in specific sectors and the determination of the relevant
market in intellectual property cases; competition, however, will
influence how such cases will be decided.

21. Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 54.
22. See Harold R. Weinberg, Is the Monopoly Theory of Trademarks Robust or a Bust?, 13
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 142 (2005).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on
Building in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 483–84 (2009).
25. See Commission Notice 97/3, 1997 O.J. (372) 1, ¶ 1 (EU) (stating “The purpose of this
notice is to provide guidance as to how the Commission applies the concept of relevant product
and geographic market in its ongoing enforcement of Community competition law.”).
26. Id. ¶ 7.
27. Id. ¶ 8.
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Where intellectual property owners are differentiating their
products, they will tend to prevent the entry into the market of similar
products and embrace a monopolist nature, which could distort
competition. As James Keyte observed, “product differentiation and
indirect competition are encompassed within the concept of
28
‘monopolistic competition’ developed in the 1930s.”
For example,
Keyte clarifies Joan Robinson’s and Edward Chamberlin’s explanation
that “significant differentiation made every producer a ‘monopolist’
over its own product to the extent it faced a downward-sloping demand
29
curve.” The same argument can be used when discussing products that
are the subject of intellectual property rights and trade marks in
particular. As Keyte argued, “product differentiation itself indicates the
existence of some degree of market power since it gives the producer
30
the ability to price above cost.” This article will further expand upon
the arguments surrounding product differentiation in Part VI below.
A. Economic Definition of Monopoly
In order to get a firm grasp of the concept of monopolies, one must
examine how economic theorists have discussed the concept. The
standard textbooks on microeconomics tell us that a monopoly is a
single seller of a product for which there is no close substitute, and that
market power is the ability of the monopolist to charge a price above
31
marginal cost and earn a positive profit. For instance, one of the more
popular textbooks in European schools of economics, authored by Hal
Varian, explains that when there is only one firm in the market, that
32
firm is unlikely to take the market price as given. Instead, a
“monopoly would recognize its influence over the market price and
choose that level of price and output that maximized its overall
33
profits.” The definition of monopoly in industrial organization (a subbranch of microeconomics) literature similarly defines monopoly as a

28. James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a
Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 701 (1995).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 698.
31. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 423 (7th
ed. 2006).
32. Id. at 423–24.
33. Id.; see also ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 409 (6th ed. 2006)
(stating that “[a] monopoly is a market structure in which a single seller of a product with no
close substitutes serves the entire market”).
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single seller facing competitive consumers in one or several markets.
As such the monopoly can determine either the price of the product or
35
the quantity supplied.
Monopoly pricing can be divided into two distinct categories: a
36
single product monopoly and a multi-product monopoly. In the
former, a monopolist sells only one good and, as such, represents a
37
model of imperfect competition. In the latter, on the other hand, the
“demand and cost of one product do not affect demand and cost for
38
other products.”
The definition of monopoly is essential to identifying the issue and
arguments in this article, especially the relationship between
competition (or antitrust policy) and intellectual property, specifically
trade marks. Since a monopoly encompasses a markedly different form
of market structure, as compared to perfect competition, monopolies can
dominate the market. Perfect competition and monopolies are two
market structures at opposite ends of the competitive spectrum. In
contrast to perfect competition, monopolies involve barriers to market
39
entry, long-run abnormal profits, and differentiated products. As a
result, monopolists can abuse their market power by restricting output
40
and forcing price increases on the customer. In this regard, as Robert
Frank explains, the key feature that differentiates the monopoly from
the competitive firm, is the price elasticity of the demand facing the
41
firm.

34. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.4(b) (2d ed. 1999).
35. OZ SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 71–72 (1995); see
also WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1 (3d ed. 1990).
36. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 533 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 535.
39. The concept of perfect competition is based on a large range of assumptions, however.
The assumptions frequently applicable are: (1) the firm is a price taker (every firm in the market
is so small relative to the market that it cannot exert any perceptible influence on price); (2) the
product is homogenous (in the eyes of the consumer, the product of one seller is identical to that
of another seller); (3) there is freedom of entry and exit; (4) free mobility of resources; and (5) the
participants in the market have perfect knowledge (consumers know prices, producers know
costs, etc.). See also G.S. MADDALA & ELLEN MILLER, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 283 (1989) (explaining that in a market characterized by perfect competition, no
individual buyer or seller influences the price by his or her purchases or sales).
40. See FRANK, supra note 33, at 409; Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and
Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 245 (1987) (“When economists use the terms
’market power’ or ‘monopoly power’, they usually mean the ability to price at a supracompetitive
level.”). See also “Market Power”, Economics: A-Z, THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.
com/economics-a-to-z/m#node-21529856 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
41. See FRANK, supra note 33, at 409.
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In relation to intellectual property rights, monopolies held by
individuals or organizations may begin by the granting of a patent or
copyright, by the possession of a superior skill or talent, or by the
ownership of strategic capital. Thus, the monopolist establishes a
market position through the ability to control absolutely the supply of a
product or service offered for sale and the related ability to set the
42
price.
However, another area of intellectual property rights that is often
ignored when it comes to applying the theory of monopoly, is trade
marks. While monopoly power is normally associated with government
franchise agreements or with businesses that operate privately and
43
amass significant market power, the connection between monopolies
and trade mark protection does not get the same amount of scrutiny. The
degree of monopoly, especially as the discussion on economic literature
in Part III below will show, is crucial to further understanding antitrust
law and its relationship to intellectual property rights, particularly trade
marks.
To this end, market power, which is a crucial aspect of the
economics of competition law, is also significant to how we
conceptualize and understand the economic effect of trade marks. In this
respect, and also from what we have gleaned from the economic theory
of monopoly, the behavior of monopolists must then be put under the
microscope. From a legal perspective, such microscopic examination
can only be done through the legal provisions that regulate or prohibit
44
abuse of a dominant position. These legal provisions are Article 102 of
45
the TFEU in the EU and Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the
46
United States.

42. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 672 (Douglas Greenwald ed. 1982).
43. See, e.g., Michael D. Blanchard, Regulated Industries—Statutory Construction of
Section 541(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: A
Presumption in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437 (1996) (discussing the
market power of private cable companies); see also Solveig Singleton, The Patent Prejudice:
Intellectual Property As Monopoly, PROGRESS ON POINT, Oct. 2006, at 4–5.
44. The dominant position referred to in Article 102 of the TFEU relates to a position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking that enables it “to hinder the maintenance of
effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately consumers.” Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 229; see also Case 27/76, United Brands
v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
45. See TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
46. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
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Intellectual property rights protection is not granted out of thin air.
The granting of intellectual property rights protection is a legal process
that covers a period of time for the right holder to benefit from the fruits
48
of his labor. This period of protection varies. For instance, in
copyrights, the period of protection is the life of the author plus seventy
49
years. While in patents, the protection generally lasts for twenty
50
51
years. In trade marks, however, protection is normally indefinite.
What these areas of protection do tell us however is that they are a form
of legal monopoly resulting from the exclusivity and absoluteness of the
intellectual property protection. This form of legal monopoly then is
bound to present problems for antitrust law. One such problem is the
abuse of a dominant position by the right holder.
A distinguished legal scholar on intellectual property rights in the
EU, Guy Tritton, has identified three schools of thought “to considering
whether the exercise of [intellectual property rights] is or is not an abuse
52
of a dominant position.” The schools of thought are: (1) “the exercise
of [intellectual property rights] can never amount to an abuse;” (2) “the
grant of a monopoly to an [intellectual property rights] owner is in
effect a state-granted sanction to exploit the market in the protected
product to the full extent that the market place can bear;” and, (3) “the
exercise of [intellectual property rights] by a dominant undertaking
must be subject to the same controls as the exercise of other types of
53
economic power by a dominant undertaking.”
Tritton’s schools of thought are somewhat similar to the U.S.
schools of thought, especially the law and economics perspectives of
54
Chicago and Harvard. The U.S. schools of thought on law and
economics have significantly influenced antitrust policy-making in the
EU and can be considered as one of the great American exports to the

47. Blanchard v. Hill, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 692–94; 2 Atk. 484, 484–86 (as described
by Lord Hardwicke in his opinion).
48. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 291
(1988).
49. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 92 (2006).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. GUY TRITTON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 996 (3d ed. 2007).
53. Id. at 996–97.
54. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 691–94 (2010).
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55

EU. The rules regulating monopoly or attempts at monopolization in
the EU are strikingly similar to the relevant provisions in the Sherman
56
Act. For instance, Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that
every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
57
foreign nations, shall be guilty of a felony.

Although the European legal counterpart is worded differently, it
sends the same legal message by providing that
any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
58
between Member States.

Thus, under the U.S. approach, monopolization contains two
elements that correspond to dominance and abuse: (1) the possession of
59
monopoly power and (2) the willful acquisition of that power. In the
60
EU, Article 102 of the TFEU does not define dominance per se. It
does require, however, two broad categories of abuse, namely
61
exploitative abuse and exclusionary abuse. In principle, the other
categories, such as tying and discrimination, are more or less included
62
in these two categories. Equating trade marks to monopolies arises
from the legal protection of trade marks, which “allows an investment in
quality to be rewarded by repeat purchase and other reputation
63
effects.” It is this form of reward that generates monopoly power over
55. See generally id.; EUROPEAN ECON. & MKTG. CONSULTANTS, MODERNISATION
ARTICLE 102 TFEU 1, available at http://www.ee-mc.com/files/Modernisation%20Article%2010
2.pdf.
56. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2; TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
57. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2.
58. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
59. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). A 2005 U.S. Congressional Report distinguished monopoly and monopolization as separate concepts by analysing the
statements of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission on merger enforcement and some government actions against Microsoft and Intel
Corporations. See H. Rpt. 109-541, Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006.
60. See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 262 (4th ed. 2010); TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
61. See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 60, at 269.
62. Id. at 271 (describing price discrimination as exploitative abuse), 277 (suggesting that
tying is an exclusionary abuse).
63. Pierre Régibeau & Katharine Rockett, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property
Law and Competition Law:
An Economic Approach, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 505, 520 (Steven D. Anderman
ed., 2007).
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the distinctive trade mark in the sense that others can be excluded from
64
using the same or a confusingly similar trade mark.
Perhaps the earliest signal that trade mark protection constitutes a
65
monopoly was the 1742 judgment in Blanchard v. Hill. There, Lord
Hardwicke referred to a trade mark charter as “one of those
66
monopolies.” Since this landmark ruling, equating trade marks to
monopolies has been a roller coaster ride in the courts on both sides of
67
the Atlantic. In addition, the discussion on the monopolistic nature of
trade mark protection has been even more prevalent in scholarly debate.
III. THE LITERATURE ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF TRADE MARKS
In contemporary times, where trade mark rights encourage more
68
economic activities, law and economics approaches to trade mark are
69
somewhat under-theorized, as explained by Graeme Dinwoodie. One
reason for the under-theorizing of trade mark law may well be that the
simplicity of trade marks does not warrant much of an intellectual
70
inquiry. In other words, trade marks are just signs and symbols that
71
72
signify a brand or quality.
64. See also id. at 505–52.
65. Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep, supra note 47, at 692–93 (2 ATK 484–85).
66. Id.
67. See Monopoly Rights and Registered Trademarks—Sample Registered Trademark
Cases, BATTLE FOR TRADEMARKS, http://www.battle.ie/monopoly.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2012); Weinberg, supra note 22, at 141–45.
68. At this stage, the reader should note that this article will not be mathematically oriented,
but rather explanatory. The reader should also note that the terms ‘competition’ and ‘antitrust’ are
used interchangeably and should not alter the linguistic tone of this article. Secondly, ‘firms’ or
‘manufacturers’ are also used interchangeably. Thirdly, ‘market power’ and ‘monopoly power’
are one and the same for the purposes of this paper. For similar discussion to the latter, see
generally Krattenmaker et al., supra note 40 (arguing that attempting to distinguish between
‘market power’ and ‘monopoly power’ creates a false dichotomy). See also DENNIS W. CARLTON
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 97–98 (1989) (explaining that
monopoly power and market power are used interchangeably in their book to mean “the ability to
profitably set price above competitive levels (that is, above marginal cost)”). There, one of the
more common concepts in microeconomics is introduced for the first time—marginal cost. See id.
at 98. As such, economists use both ‘market power’ and ‘monopoly power’ to refer to the power
of a single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal cost. See id.
69. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms 6 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
Dinwoodie listed a few notable exceptions such as Landes & Posner and Schechter. Id. at n.18;
see also Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1949) (explaining the social values behind trademarks).
70. Section 1127 of the Lanham Act stipulates that the term “trademark” means:
[A]ny word, name or symbol, or device, or any combination thereof— (1) used
by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce to
identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service,
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Another explanation may well be that, given the abundance of
trade marks, it is just natural to register a trade mark when starting a
business. In this regard, like the common surname, trade marks can be
explained in a historical context rather than through ‘theoretical
approaches.’ Dinwoodie’s assertion that the law and economics
approaches to trade marks are under-theorized does not necessarily
reflect the true picture, however. As discussed in this section, scholars
such as Landes & Posner, Barnes, Lemley, and a host of others have
actually made significant contributions in this area.
Whatever the explanations for the under-theorizing of trade mark
law, trade marks are powerful symbols or service marks. They serve as
73
carriers of information or as company assets and indicators of
corporate strengths. These roles put trade marks at the very heart of
society, and thus causes trade marks to have a beneficial effect on
society. This effect stems from the interaction between variations in
trade marks and consumers. Trade marks relay information to
consumers, and therefore are essential to the very existence of
74
competition.
from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that
source is unknown.
Lanham Act, supra note 9, § 1127. This latter definition of trademarks in the Lanham Act is
similar to language that was first used to define trademarks in the first written treatise on
trademark law:
A trademark is the name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device, adopted and used,
by a manufacturer, or merchant, in order to designate the goods that he
manufacturers, or sells, and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
another; to the end that they may be known in the market, as his, and thus enable
him to secure such profits as result from a reputation for superior skill, industry or
enterprise.
FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 9 (1860).
71. See Lanham Act, supra note 9, § 1127. This article loosely refers to brand as part of
trademark protection. Brands are special intangible assets and for most companies are the most
important asset due to the economic impact that brands have.
72. Though this article will not discuss at length the quality functions of trademarks, it has
long been the favorite of legal academics that began with the writings of the American academic
Frank I. Schechter’s 1927 article in the Harvard Law Review, cited infra note 76. The courts
rarely depart from emphasizing the quality function of trademarks and in the Park ‘N Fly
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that trademarks “foster competition and the maintenance
of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of a good reputation.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
73. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev.
621, 645–46 (outlining some of the theoretical intricacies of the relationship between a mark, a
marked product, and the information supposedly conveyed by the mark), 623 (explaining how
trade marks function as a company asset and indicator of corporate strength) (2004) [hereinafter
Semiotic Analysis].
74. See generally Spyros M. Maniatis, Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET FREEDOM 63–130 (Adrian Sterling ed., 1997).
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A. Economic Functions of Trade Marks Versus the Commercial
Magnetism of Trade Marks
Inquiries into trade mark protection, especially from a law and
75
economics perspective, have been a rich form of academic scholarship
76
in the past century. That tradition continues to this day, especially
within the context of the economic effects of antitrust and intellectual
77
property law.
The trouble with trade mark law as opposed to other areas of
traditional intellectual property law is that trade mark protection differs
from the traditional intellectual property regime. This difference is even
78
more evident in the legal basis and economic functions of trade marks.
One could argue that the difference is due to the fact that the purpose of
traditional intellectual property protection is to create incentives in
return for the inventor or creator realizing economic gains, even though
the creation of trade marks does not necessarily require any form of
‘innovativeness.’ However, this line of argument may not sit well with

75. The economic analysis of law draws upon the principles of microeconomic theory which
concerns decision-making by individuals and small firms. For a thorough discussion, see, for
example, ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2004); see also John
Kay, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 337 (1993)
(explaining how much a copyright is worth).
76. The law and economics movement, which began to take shape at the turn of the
twentieth century, was not exclusively applied to trademarks per se but other forms of law that
would entail trademarks as a form of intellectual property right such as contract law. The law and
economics approaches to law emerged from the legal realism movement especially in American
legal literature. For a discussion on the historical perspectives on this, see generally MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992). Perhaps one of the earliest enquiries into the pure law and economics of
trademarks was the seminal piece by Frank Schechter, which appeared in the legal literature in
1927. See generally Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 813 (1927) (explaining the nature and function of trademarks). Since Schechter’s work,
other influential pieces have popped up in bits and pieces that essentially shook the foundation
under the law and economics of trademarks without much serious aftershocks, see, e.g., William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267
(1988), and more recently, David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 22 (2006). This is by no means an exhaustive list and as the reader will discover in
the next few sections of this article several other important works have made similar
contributions.
77. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 237, 237 (2007) (arguing that “when intellectual property laws are strong, then
antitrust laws should also be strong and vice versa”).
78. See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 20 (1991).
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the owners of trade marks who clearly believe that their trade marks and
79
brands provide economic incentives.
Once a trade mark has been established, the trade mark owner has
80
something of value. In Mishawaka Rubber, Justice Frankfurter
declared that “[a] trademark is a merchandising ‘short-cut’ which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
81
believe he wants.” Justice Frankfurter reasoned that “the owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
82
congenial symbol.” Justice Frankfurter further opined that:
[w]hatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to convey
through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is
attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has
83
created, the owner can obtain legal redress.

In the above case, Justice Frankfurter framed the functions of trade
mark for its “commercial magnetism” as part of the economic activity
84
of modern society. Thus, one could further argue that in doing so,
Justice Frankfurter declared the functions of trade mark to be both
economic and legal. The dual functions of trade mark are evident in the
opinion, which addresses the economic function in terms of the trade
mark owner’s having “something of value” and “commercial
magnetism” while describing the fact that “the owner can obtain legal
85
redress” as the legal function.
Similarly, the ECJ developed the concept of how the “essential
function” of a trade mark guarantees the identity of the origin of the

79. Brands contribute to companies by building shareholder’s value, and in 2009 the brand
value of the world’s top five companies were valued respectively as: Coca-Cola (USD$70B);
IBM (USD$64B); Microsoft (USD$60B); Google (USD$43B); and GE (USD$42B). See full
ranking at Best Global Brands 2010, INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-globalbrands/Best-Global-Brands-2010.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). The top three global brands
have only slipped three to five percentage points since 2001. For a legal discussion on brands and
the law, see generally Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law,
2010 BYU L. REV. 1425 (discussing how trademarks and antitrust law have misunderstood
brands).
80. Goodwill as an intangible asset serves as a major reason for consumers’ choice among
brands. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 761 (1990).
81. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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86

trade marked product to the consumer. In addition to the guarantee of
trade mark origin, the ECJ in Ideal-Standard said the essential function
87
of a mark is also as a form of guarantee of unitary control. Thus, based
on its legal definition, the essential function of a trade mark is to
88
describe “the purpose and rationale of trade marks.” Another rationale
for trade mark protection is the fact that trade marks have been in
existence since primitive man began to trade with his animals, and the
“branding of cattle and other animals” developed as the first kind of
89
marking. Despite the nuances surrounding its history, a trade mark’s
fundamental function is therefore to identify products and their origin.
In modern times, the owner of a new product may apply to register
his or her trade mark under the applicable rules in the territory where
90
that particular product will be sold or marketed. The historical
development of trade mark protection is nevertheless important since
trade mark protection has been known to protect the economic trading
91
activities of man. Furthermore, in the modern era, “the value of
trademarks to both consumers and owners is an incentive to
92
preservation, and the exclusive ownership” of an established trade
86. For instance, in Arsenal FC v. Reed, the ECJ said “the essential function of a trademark
is to guarantee the identity of origin of the marked goods [ . . . ].” Case C-206/01, Arsenal
Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶ 48. See also Hoffman-La Roche, where the
court said that the essential function of a trademark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the
trade-marked product to the consumer and to prevent confusion and interference. Case 102/77,
Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, ¶ 7.
87. Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994
E.C.R. I-2789, 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994), especially ¶ 37, where the court said, “for the trademark to
be able to fulfill its role, it must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced
under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality.” (citing Case C10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3752, ¶ 13.)
88. See TRITTON ET AL., supra note 52, at 261. For earlier discussions on trademarks quality
see generally Schechter, supra note 76.
89. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP.
222, 223 (1983). The early development or discovery of trademarks has been credited to
archaeologists and other collectors who were not concentrating on trademarks. For more on this,
see generally id. Diamond explained that in legal writings there have been nuances surrounding
the historical development of trademarks and cited inconsistencies with the invention of pottery,
which was claimed to have been invented in China in 2698 BC but was also found in Egyptian
tombs in 3500 BC. See id. at 222–23. Other claims to the early discovery of trademarks have been
made, but it would be beyond the scope of this article to get into the proper historical
developments of trademarks.
90. Compare Besen & Raskind, supra note 78, at 21 (identifying the origin of trademark
protection with the medieval guild practice of affixing an identifying mark to a goblet or like
product) with Diamond, supra note 89, at 223 (identifying various inconsistencies with the origin
of trademarks).
91. See Patricia Kimball Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value
of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 302–03 (1982).
92. See id. at 325.
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mark. On the one hand, trade mark owners benefit from exclusive
ownership in order to properly deploy their trade mark-protected goods
or services; on the other hand, consumers benefit from quality and
choice under a trade mark system “that preserves trademarks as source
93
identifiers,” leading to economies of scale and lower prices. Thus, it is
94
hard for one to ignore the economic effect of trade marks.
B. Do Trade Marks Create Monopolies?
A trade mark is a form of property and as a form of property it
becomes valuable to the “extent that it carries with it some degree of
95
monopoly power.” The economic effect of trade marks is felt once
96
trade mark protection has been granted. As Papandreou explained in
his 1956 article, the exclusiveness of a monopoly has not changed in
modern times, since a monopoly entails “the power to affect the choice
97
or decision of the buyer.”
In a regulatory environment where antitrust laws are shaped to
curb the market power of firms—if a firm gains too much market power
it is deemed a monopoly and thus in breach of antitrust laws—then there
should be no exception for trade mark protection. In trade marks,
monopolies are created from the ‘exclusivity’ and the ‘absoluteness’ of
98
the mark. Firms with well-known marks are able to corner the
consumer with effective advertising, market entry barriers for other
99
firms, and thus create monopoly profits. Consumers caught in the
middle may pay little attention to the market power of the firm and thus
find it impossible to tell whether they are benefiting from lower search
100
costs, or are enhancing the monopoly profits of the firm.
93. See id. at 326–27.
94. For a concise discussion of some of the economic roles of trademarks, such as helping
the consumer to identify the “unobservable features of the trademarked product,” see Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988).
95. A.G. Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 503, 504
(1956).
96. Id. (“The essence of this power is the asymmetrical character of the seller-buyer
relationship. The seller, if he has monopoly power, sets his price in full view of the anticipated
reaction of the buyer to the set price. The capacity of the seller to set higher alternative prices
without losing all his customers to competitors is the evidence of his monopoly power. In view of
this concept of monopoly power, it follows that to argue that a trademark has been put to
influential use is tantamount to arguing that it has given rise to monopoly power.”).
97. Id.
98. See Dan Shanahan, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly?, 72
TRADEMARK REP. 233, 240 (1982).
99. See id. at 248.
100. For similar arguments, see Dan Shanahan, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection
or Monopoly?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 233, 248–49 (1982).
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Monopolies or firms with excess market power reduce consumer
choice and place on the consumer higher purchasing costs by raising
101
prices. Monopolies also impose what economists call a ‘“deadweight
loss’ on society by reducing their output below the level which
102
consumers would be willing to purchase at a competitive price.” The
intellectual property system, which grants monopoly rights to investors
by the granting of patents, has been compared to the government system
that pays rewards to innovators and found that the intellectual property
system does not have much advantage over the government rewards
103
system.
The question then becomes whether trade mark protection creates
104
monopolies. This question is not new and has been posed several
105
times in the literature on both law and economics.
According to
Economides, “[c]ontrary to a widespread belief, competition is not
106
always beneficial to society,” and three distortions may result from
107
perception advertising. “By perception advertising, a mental image
may be added to the quality and variety features of a trademarked
108
product, permitting competition in yet another dimension.” The three
possible distortions are:
(a) the ability of firms to differentiate products in perceived features
may result in more than the optimal number of brands, counteracting
economies of scale; (b) precommitted advertising may initially create
monopoly power and profits, which then result in the entry of more
than the optimal number of firms and the underproduction of each
brand; and (c) perception advertising may distort purchasing
decisions, depending on whether mental images are considered

101. See Lemley, supra note 77, at 241.
102. Id.; see also Barnes, supra note 76, at 39 (stating that deadweight loss results from the
failure to supply search information to people who would be willing to pay some amount greater
than the marginal cost of supplying a good to them but less than the price with a mark-up to cover
the cost of producing search information).
103. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 525–26 (2001).
104. In hindsight, the straightforward answer is affirmative “since a trademark is principally
an open ended monopoly for exclusive use—a monopoly that is legally assigned and enforced by
extending the property rights concept far into the realm of intangibles.” Hannes Rösler, The
Rationale for European Trade Mark Protection, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 100, 100 (2007);
see also Papandreou, supra note 95, at 504.
105. See, e.g., Economides, supra note 94, at 532 (citing EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56–70 (8th ed. 1969) [hereinafter CHAMBERLIN 8th
ed.]).
106. Economides, supra note 94, at 533.
107. Id. at 532.
108. Id.
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valuable. These potential distortions, however, are more than offset
by the efficiencies arising from a trademark’s ability to distinguish
between goods with unobservable variances in quality and variety
109
features.

These views by Economides are interesting, and the above passage
captures both the law and economics of trade marks, as well as the
overriding theme of this article: that trade marks create monopolies.
One of the earliest known court cases where trade mark protection
was equated with monopoly was the eighteenth-century English case
110
Blanchard v. Hill. The case concerned a charter granted by King
Charles to a card-maker who was given the exclusive right to use a
111
certain stamp. The court refused to enjoin a second card-maker from
112
using the same stamp on his playing cards. During the course of the
opinion, Lord Hardwicke referred to the charter as “one of those
113
monopolies which were so frequent” under certain earlier monarchs.
This tells us that the courts have always treated trade marks as another
form of intellectual property: monopolies. Trade mark protection
seemed to enjoy a certain period of monopoly protection, however,
before it was again brought before the courts due to the enactment of
antitrust law in the United States, and other consumer protection laws in
parts of Europe, prior to the creation of the European Union. Outside of
the courts, academic literature on the law and economics of trade marks
took the debate to a new level.
The literature on the law and economics of trade marks is not so
large and it is at best divided into two competing camps: the Harvard
School and the Chicago School (and to be fair to Europe, the Austrian
114
School). The Chicago School is often seen as the more domineering
of the two schools, as is evidenced in the writing of scholars such as
Landes & Posner, and Barnes. The law and economics of other areas of
intellectual property on the other hand, is voluminous, in particular
115
relating to copyrights and patents.
109. Id.
110. See Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. supra note 47, at 692–94 (2 ATK 484–86); for
comments, see, for example, Norma Dawson, English Trade Mark Law in the Eighteenth
Century: Blanchard v. Hill Revisited—Another ‘Case of Monopolies’?, 24 J. LEGAL HIST. 111
(2003).
111. Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep., supra note 47, at 692–93 (2 ATK 484–85).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 693.
114. See, e.g., JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 60, at 33 (“The Austrian School embraces a
theory of dynamic competition which goes beyond that advanced by Schumpeter.”).
115. The modern literature has its historical foundation in the legacy of Frank I. Schechter’s
1927 seminal article, see supra note 76. Since then, the economic effects of trademarks have
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The different sets of literature used in this paper thus far reveals
one thing—they all advocate different approaches to the economic
analyses of trade marks. For instance, Professor David Barnes argues
that a trade mark is a public good and “the entire trademark literature
has failed to appreciate the market failures associated with the supply of
trademarks and the information they provide about products and sources
116
of products.” This recent work by Professor Barnes is impressive and
gives a thorough discussion of trade marks as public goods. He argues
that public goods theory demonstrates that market failures justify
government intervention and therefore are similar to other branches of
intellectual property such as patents and copyrights. This thesis supports
my argument that the relationship between trade marks as a branch of
117
intellectual property and antitrust needs clarification.
Another
argument that is quite popular in the literature is that trade mark is a tool
118
for pursuing efficiency.
This argument is represented in the
scholarship of Landes & Posner, using an economic model of property
119
rights.
Furthermore, even more recent scholarship argues that
“property-based trademark protection risks . . . creating unjustified and
120
inappropriate market power.”
The two sparring camps on the literature on the law and economics
—the Chicago School and the Harvard School—both have their
121
advantages and disadvantages. The Chicago School of thought, as
developed by Posner, argues that trade mark protection lowers the

appeared roughly every ten years, see for instance Papandreou, supra note 95. This began to
change course with Richard Posner’s economic analysis of the law, RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1974), and subsequent works such as William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987)
[hereinafter Trademark Law] and also sources cited therein; other notable economic analyses of
trademark law in recent years include Barnes, supra note 76, at 35 (arguing that trademarks are a
species of public goods, in particular, mixed public goods).
116. Barnes, supra note 76, at 24.
117. Id. at 35.
118. Trademark Law, supra note 115, at 265–66.
119. Id. at 266–68.
120. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 373 (1999).
121. The Chicago School of law and economics is more dominating in the literature to the
extent that there is no “alternative account of trademark law doctrine.” Semiotic Analysis, supra
note 73, at 623–24; see generally Trademark Law, supra note 115.
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122

consumer search cost,
while the Harvard School centers on the
123
monopolistic nature of trade marks.
The Chicago School analysis of antitrust is entrenched in the
model of perfect competition which is based on the assumption that all
sellers sell a homogenous product so that buyers are indifferent about
124
from whom they buy if prices are the same. This is by no means the
only assumption of the model of perfect competition on which the
Chicago School is based. The model also assumes that each seller is
small in proportion to the entire market so that his determinations about
output and price do not affect output and price in the market, that all
sellers have the same access to all kinds of inputs, and that all
participants have full knowledge about all the relevant factors in the
125
market.
The Harvard School (the monopolist school of thought) argues that
trade mark protection, through the control of distinct product markets by
126
their owners, inherently leads to monopoly. This article fits within
this camp. Regardless, these schools of thought add considerable
support for the rational basis of trade mark protection, and seemingly
agree that trade marks reduce the consumer’s search cost and open more
choices to the consumer. Thus, the consumer is able to distinguish
quality goods from those whose origin may not necessarily be of the
same standard. The results of the early case law discussion and the
economic literature suggests that trade marks evolve into monopolies.
IV. TRADE MARK DISTINCTIVENESS AND ECONOMIC DISTINCTIVENESS
A recent empirical study reported that 26.7% of respondents
thought that the word “wonderful” indicated the source of the chocolate
coconut macaroons (cookies) depicted in the stimulus, even when the
authors regarded the use as ‘non-trademark use’ and placed the word in
127
small font at the bottom-right-hand corner of the package.
The
authors advocated abandoning the non-inherently distinctive category of

122. For empirical evidence in support of search cost rationale, see I.P.L. Png & David
Reitman, Why are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 207, 208–11
(1995).
123. See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN 8th ed., supra note 105, at 56–70, 270–74; Lunney, Jr., supra
note 120, at 368 (especially n.6); Papandreou, supra note 95, at 504.
124. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 1.1(a).
125. See id.
126. See Lunney, Jr., supra note 120, at 370.
127. See Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1090, 1097, fig. 5d. (2009).
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word marks in the threshold evaluation of trade mark distinctiveness.
129
Although the authors admitted that their proposal is “heretical,”
this
part of the article will seek to actually develop the arguments for
distinctiveness and examine more closely what this article terms the
economics of distinctiveness in trade marks. The arguments are centered
primarily on analysis of cases in the ECJ and the Office for
Harmonization of the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)
(OHIM).
Professor Barton Beebe has identified two forms of trade mark
distinctiveness, namely “source distinctiveness, which describes the
trademark’s distinctiveness of source, and differential distinctiveness,
which describes the trademark’s distinctiveness from other
130
trademarks.” These two forms of trade mark distinctiveness form part
of the overall concept of distinctiveness in trade mark law, and the
concept of distinctiveness “is the hinge on which trademark law
131
turns.” It is an undisputed fact that “[t]rade marks are a source of
information[;] [t]hey are the byproduct of market enterprise and market
132
place competition.”
As such, trade marks’ distinctiveness is an
133
essential component of the registration of trade marks.
A trade mark becomes eligible for registration when it has, among
other things, a distinctive character. Under the EU’s Trade Marks
Directive, a trade mark may be refused registration or declared invalid
where it is registered, if it is found to be “devoid of any distinctive
134
character.” On a comparative note, similar language can be found in
similar statutes in other jurisdictions. For example, under Section 41 of

128. Id. at 1038.
129. Id. at 1039.
130. Semiotic Analysis, supra note 73, at 621; see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion
in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2028 (2005).
131. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK W. JANIS, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 52 (2008).
132. CATHERINE COLSTON & KIRSTY MIDDLETON, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 501 (2d ed. 2005).
133. As recently argued by one scholar, “trade mark law only protects ‘distinctive’ marks,
because only distinctive marks are likely to signify product source to consumers and because
effective competition requires that competitors have access to commonplace, descriptive, and
generic words and symbols.” Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of
“Trademark Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 378 (2006) [hereinafter Barrett, Internet
Trademark Suits].
134. Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, at L 299/27; “[T]he grounds for refusal or
invalidity concerning the trade mark itself, for example, the absence of any distinctive character.”
Id. at L 299/26.
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135

the Australian Trade Marks Act,
distinctiveness is a condition of
136
registration, and in other parts of the Australian Trade Marks Act, a
137
lack of distinction may be used to oppose registration of the mark.
In addition, a lack of distinctiveness may be used to rectify the
138
register and cancel a mark.
Furthermore, the concept of
distinctiveness is key to determining whether there has been an
139
infringement.
Distinctiveness under Section 41 of the Australian
Trade Marks Act has been tested on several occasions before Australian
courts, where the courts confirmed that Section 41 conceives three
methods by which a word or symbol may be capable of distinguishing
the applicant’s goods or services from goods or services of other
140
persons.
In the United States, distinctiveness is covered by the Lanham
141
Trademark Act, where eligibility for trade mark protection requires
142
that the mark be distinctive and used in commerce.
The
‘distinctiveness’ requirement in the United States addresses a trade
mark’s capacity for identifying and distinguishing goods and services
143
from one producer. Trade marks are traditionally divided into four
categories of distinctiveness: arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, descriptive,
144
and generic.
These four conditions were earlier established in
145
Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, pertaining to word marks.
To ascertain the distinctiveness criteria in Europe, this article will
turn to cases from the ECJ and the Board of Appeals of the OHIM, but

135. Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.). Under Section 41, there are indications of three
main types of distinctiveness. First, Section 41(3) provides “the trade mark is inherently adapted
to distinguish . . .”; second, Section 41(5) provides that “the trade mark is to some extent
inherently adapted to distinguish . . . that the mark is capable of so distinguishing . . .”; and last,
Section 41(6) provides that “the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish.”
136. Id. § 41(2).
137. Id. §§ 41(2), 88(1)(a)–(2)(a).
138. Id.
139. See id. § 120.
140. Id. § 41. Therese Catanzariti, Mark of Cain—Distinctiveness in the Trade Marks Act 5
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative
Law Review) (citing Unilever Austl. Ltd. v. Karounos (2001) 113 FCR 322, 335 ¶ 46 (Austl.))
available at http://www.13wentworthselbornechambers.com.au/pdfs/distinctivenessintrademark
law.pdf; see also Chocolaterie Guylian NV v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2009) 82 IPR 13
(Austl.); ROBERT R. BURRELL & MICHAEL M. HANDLER, AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK LAW 77–
138 (2011).
141. See generally Lanham Act, supra note 9.
142. Id. §§ 1051(b)(3)(B), (D).
143. Id. § 1052.
144. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983).
145. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
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and try to make sense, if any,

A. ‘Distinguish’ and ‘Distinctive’: The Dichotomy of Distinctiveness
One of the recurring features, or more precisely, frequent words in
the various trade mark laws mentioned above is the appearance of the
147
verb ‘distinguish’ or its adjective ‘distinguishing.’ The meaning of a
word or phrase has an impact on how the law is interpreted. In
hindsight, one could easily argue that the verb ‘distinguish’ points out a
difference between two people or things. Similarly, it could be argued
that the adjective ‘distinctive,’ from which ‘distinctiveness’ is derived,
serves to distinguish a person or thing from others. As coherent (or
perhaps incoherent) such an argument may be, it is not authoritative for
the purposes of legal interpretation, although some courts refer to
dictionaries for literal interpretation of words in order to reach a
148
decision.
Depending on the jurisdiction, courts and arbitrators
generally turn to dictionaries in their language or versions of a language
to obtain precisely the meaning of words that need interpretation for
149
legal purposes. This article relies on Webster’s College Dictionary to
argue that ‘distinguish’ means “to mark off as different” or “to set apart
150
as different.” ‘Distinctive’ is also defined in the same dictionary as
151
“serving to distinguish; characteristics.”
In a legal context, consumers in the Anglo-Saxon world are easily
informed by the mark ‘Coca-Cola’ that the item is a genuine product of
The Coca-Cola Company Inc.; however, consumers outside the AngloSaxon world, might easily confuse the sign ‘Coco-Coke’ or ‘CocaColla’ as that of The Coca-Cola Company Inc., when it is in fact that of
a domestic rival marketing a similar product to stimulate healthy
152
competition in the economy.
The argument here is that because
146. A mark that is inherently distinctive qualifies for registration under the Lanham Act.
Lanham Act, supra note 9, § 2(f). Furthermore, a mark can also qualify for trade mark protection
under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act if the mark has become distinctive through use in
connection with the applicant’s goods commerce, known as acquired distinctiveness. See In re
Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
147. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act 1995 § 41.
148. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dept. of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2011).
149. Id.
150. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 358 (2005).
151. Id.
152. See Rory Carroll, Coca Colla: The New ‘Real Thing’ in Bolivia, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Apr. 14, 2010, 19:23 BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/14/coca-colla-real-thingbolivia. For similar line of arguments, see generally Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 1 (examining
trademark use theory).
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“[t]rademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion . . . the
basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant’s use of a mark is illegal
153
if it confuses a substantial number of consumers.” Furthermore, due
to the current state of law, the judiciary increasingly exercises a
“willingness to find an actionable likelihood of confusion” of any
unauthorized use of a strong trade mark “with the potential to
154
undermine the symbol’s trademark distinctiveness.”
According to Professor Barton Beebe, the traditional notions of
‘inherent’ and ‘acquired’ distinctiveness tend to be confusing, not
155
clarifying.
This article strives, therefore, to provide a proper
definition of distinctiveness in trade mark law. Professor Beebe himself
provides the following explanation:
Under current doctrine, to fall within the subject matter of trademark
protection, a trademark must be found to be inherently distinctive or
to possess acquired distinctiveness. An inherently distinctive
trademark is one whose signifier cannot reasonably be understood to
156
be descriptive or decorative of the product to which it is affixed.

In order to ascertain inherent distinctiveness in trade mark
litigation, trade marks must be “suggestive” and “arbitrary or
157
fanciful.”
In contrast, acquired distinctiveness evolves through
158
“secondary meaning.” Secondary meaning is achieved when a mark
has become so distinctive that the public closely associates the mark
159
with a single source.
Trade marks with inherent distinctiveness,
however, are marks that are capable of functioning immediately upon
160
use.
The ECJ’s decision in Baby-Dry defined the nature of
161
distinctiveness in the EU. The Court said that the term ‘Baby-Dry’
was an invented term and as such does not form part of the English

153. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414
(2010).
154. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108
YALE L. J. 1717, 1722 (1999).
155. See supra note 131, at 52.
156. Beebe, supra note 73, at 669–70.
157. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.
158. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992), where the Court
described trade marks with “secondary meaning” as those which “may acquire the distinctiveness
which will allow them to be protected under the [US Lanham] Act.”
159. Id. at 765, n.4.
160. See id. at 770.
161. Case C-383/99 P, Procter & Gamble v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt.
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2001 E.C.R. I-6251, ¶¶ 39–42.
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162

language, making it eligible for registration. The Court reasoned that
such words “are lexical inventions bestowing distinctive power on the
163
mark so formed and may not be refused registration.”
The case
concerned an application filed by Procter & Gamble for a CTM
regarding disposable diapers for babies, which was refused registration
164
for being devoid of any distinctive character. Upon appeal to the ECJ,
the Court reversed the OHIM decision and thus defined distinctiveness
165
in the EU.
Overall, distinctiveness is a broad term that has littered trade mark
litigation and is merely what Professor Beebe refers to as “a general
term which trademark lawyers have long used to refer
indiscriminately—and apparently unwittingly—to one or the other of
166
two very different species of distinctiveness.”
B. Economic Distinctiveness
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun once proclaimed that the
167
“free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”
His
proclamation confirms the widely held theory that trade marks reduce
consumer search cost, given that “consumer acquisition of information
168
has a search cost,” and the “informational efficiency of trademarks
permits entry at a low cost, particularly when consumers already
169
recognize a trademark from another market.” In addition, the search
cost rationale for trade mark protection has been echoed by several
scholars, such as Professor Nicholas Economides, who argued that from

162. Id. ¶ 43. The court further stated: “Whilst each of the two words in the combination may
form part of expressions used in everyday speech to designate the functions of babies’ nappies,
their syntactically unusual juxtaposition is not a familiar expression in the English language,
either for designating babies’ nappies or for describing their essential characteristics.” Id.
163. Id. ¶ 44.
164. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
165. Id. ¶¶ 39–46.
166. Beebe, Search and Persuasion, supra note 130, at 20–28.
167. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
168. William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS
STATE L. REV. 199, 215 (1991); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
163–64 (1995).
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source identifying mark,
“reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,”
(citation omitted) for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—
the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items
that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.
Id.
169. Kratzke, supra note 168, at 217.
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an economic standpoint, the argument for trade marks is an easy one.
In plain language, Economides explained that the economic role of the
trade mark is to help the consumer identify the unobservable features of
171
the trade marked product.
Taking a cue from this statement, where the words ‘economic’ and
172
‘unobservable’ are in the same sentence, it is possible to argue that
these words form the nuclei of economic distinctiveness—which, in
trade mark law, is the ability of a trade mark proprietor who seeks
registration to be able to distinguish his goods or services from that of
the competitor. The proprietor has invented a new word, sign, or symbol
that is capable of being represented graphically to be the source of
information for his goods and services. The trade mark proprietor seeks
to foster competition by being able to distinguish himself and reap the
economic benefits of his distinctiveness.
Thus in its broadest sense, economic distinctiveness in trade mark
law “reduces consumer search costs, promotes market place efficiency,
and enables producers to reap the benefits of their investment in product
quality and business goodwill, thus providing an incentive to strive for
173
quality.” On the other side of the coin is the need for competitors to
be in one or more product markets, and the presence of a competitor in
more than one product market affects consumer perceptions of trade
marks in those markets, and eventually, the messages that trade marks
174
convey.
C. Distinctiveness in SAT.2: As Seen by the ECJ
The trade mark regime in the EU is an autonomous system with its
own set of rules and objectives peculiar to it and applied independently

170. See Economides, supra note 94, at 526–27.
In many markets, sellers have much better information as to the unobservable features
of a commodity for sale than the buyers. This is known as information asymmetry.
Unobservable features, valued by the consumer, may be crucial determinants of the
total value of the good. . . . [I]f there is a way to identify the unobservable qualities, the
consumer’s choice becomes clear . . . . The economic role of the trademark is to help
the consumer identify the unobservable features of the trademarked product. This
information is not provided to the consumer in an analytic form, such as an indication
of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in summary form, through a symbol which
the consumer identifies with a specific combination of features. Information in analytic
form is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, trademarks.
Id.
171. Id. at 526.
172. Id.
173. Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits, supra note 133, at 376.
174. Kratzke, supra note 168, at 209.
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175

of any national system.
This autonomous system of trade mark
regime in the EU has consistently been confirmed by the highest
judicial body—the ECJ. The ECJ has held that distinctiveness needs to
be viewed as a whole and has set aside a judgment of the General Court
176
(previously known as the Court of First Instance).
In SAT.2, the General Court had found that the OHIM had not
infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 (now the CTMR) by
refusing to register as a Community trade mark the term ‘SAT.2,’ in
177
respect of services which are connected with satellite broadcasting.
The bone of contention in SAT.2 was the German broadcaster SAT.1’s
application to register the mark ‘SAT.2’ as a CTM for certain goods and
178
various services, mainly in the media and information sector. The
OHIM refused the application on the ground that that term was devoid
179
of any distinctive character. SAT.1 contested the OHIM’s decision
before the General Court which focused on the interpretation of Article
180
7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94.
Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 40/94 states that trade marks devoid
of any distinctive character shall not be registered, unless “the trade
mark has become distinctive in relation to the goods or services for
which registration is requested in consequence of the use which has
181
been made of it.” The General Court annulled the decision of the
OHIM in relation to all other services, but stated that there was an
absolute ground in refusing to register the trade mark with regard to
182
services that have a connection to satellite broadcasting.
The General Court’s decision was appealed before the ECJ, which
183
rendered its decision on September 16, 2004. The ECJ confirmed that
the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of
the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end-user by

175. See Case C-488/06, L & D SA v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (citing Case C-238/06 P, Develey Holding GmbH & Co.
Beteiligungs KG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs)
(OHIM), 2007 E.C.R. I-9375, ¶¶ 65–66)).
176. Case C-329/02 P, SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 25.
177. Id. ¶¶ 9–15.
178. Id. ¶ 6 (stating that the application was made on April 15, 1997).
179. Id. ¶ 8.
180. Id. ¶ 9.
181. CTMR, supra note 7, art. 7(3) (the OHIM decision was also contested under Article
7(1)(c)).
182. SAT.1, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 12.
183. Id. at 1.
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enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the
184
product or service from others which have another origin.

The Court held, “Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation is thus intended
to preclude registration of trade marks which are devoid of distinctive
character which alone renders them capable of fulfilling that essential
185
function.” It reasoned that
in order to determine whether a sign presents a characteristic such as
to render it registrable as a trade mark, it is appropriate to take the
viewpoint of the relevant public. Where the goods or services with
which the registration application is concerned are intended for all
consumers, the relevant public must be deemed to be composed of
the average consumer, reasonably well-informed and reasonably
186
observant and circumspect.

Further, the Court held that
as regards a trade mark comprising words or a word and a digit . . .
the distinctiveness of each of those terms or elements, taken
separately, may be assessed, in part, but must, in any event, depend
187
on an appraisal of the whole which they comprise.
188

Citing Campina and KPN, the Court said that the mere fact that
each of those elements, considered separately, “is devoid of distinctive
character does not mean that their combination cannot present a
189
distinctive character.”
The ECJ in SAT.2 said the General Court
misinterpreted the provision of Article 7(1)(b) and failed to make an
examination of the distinctive character of a compound trade mark “as a
190
whole.” The General Court based its decision
on the presumption that elements individually devoid of distinctive
character cannot, on being combined, present such a character
instead of, as it should have done, on the overall perception of that
191
word by the average consumer.

184. SAT.1, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 23 (citing Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, ¶ 7).
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 24.
187. Id. ¶ 28.
188. Case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-1705,
¶¶ 40–41; Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd.,
2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶¶ 99–100.
189. SAT. 1, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 28.
190. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
191. Id. ¶ 35.
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The ECJ observed that “[r]egistration of a sign as a trade mark is
not subject to a finding of a specific level of linguistic or artistic
creativity or imaginativeness on the part of the proprietor of the
trademark,” but rather that “the trademark should enable the relevant
public to identify the origin of the goods or services protected thereby
192
and to distinguish them from those of other undertakings.”
Furthermore, the Court argued that the “frequent use of trade marks
consisting of a word and a number in the telecommunications sector
indicates that that type of combination cannot be considered to be
193
devoid, in principle, of distinctive character,” and went on to annul
the General Court’s ruling.
In later cases, the ECJ followed reasoning similar to that in SAT.2
by arguing that the assessment of a compound mark
of its distinctive character cannot be limited to an evaluation of each
of its words or components, considered in isolation, but must, on any
view, be based on the overall perception of that mark by the relevant
public and not on the presumption that elements individually devoid
of distinctive character cannot, on being combined, have a distinctive
194
character.

In Eurohypo, the Court said that the correct way to interpret Article 7 is
to do a separate and independent examination of the grounds for refusal
195
listed in Article 7(1) of the CTMR.

192. Id. ¶ 41.
193. Id. ¶ 44.
194. Case C-304/06, Eurohypo AG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2008 E.C.R. I-03297, ¶ 41.
195. Id. ¶ 54. Eurohypo AG was denied registration of the word/sign “EUROHYPO” by
OHIM, which essentially “held that the components EURO and HYPO contained a clearly
understandable indication of the characteristics” of financial services in class 36 of the Nice
Agreement and that:
the combination of those two components in one word did not render the mark less
descriptive. Therefore, it held that the word sign EUROHYPO was descriptive of
“financial affairs; monetary affairs; real estate affairs; provision of financial services;
financing” and that it was, therefore, devoid of any distinctive character within the
meaning of Article 7(1)(b) [of the Community trade mark regulation], at least in
German-speaking countries, and that that ground was sufficient, under Article 7(2) of
the regulation, to justify a refusal of protection.
Id. ¶ 10. The OHIM decision was contested before the General Court in 2004 claiming
infringement of Article 74(1) and Article 7(1)(b) of the Community trademark regulation. The
General Court rejected both pleas, which was appealed to the EUCJ, which in turn dismissed the
action against the OHIM and set aside the judgment of the General Court. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 23, 65.
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D. Acquired Distinctiveness
1. The OHIM Board of Appeals and Acquired Distinctiveness
in Color Marks
As with the many developments in trade mark law, one must
constantly turn to the judicial bodies for legal guidance and often the
state of play. The results of surveys are often some of the more
compelling evidence that a proprietor can use to argue that a mark has
acquired distinctiveness through use (or secondary meaning, as it is
referred in some jurisdictions). Acquired distinctiveness or secondary
meaning refers to the situation that arises when a mark might be
ineligible for registration were it not for the fact that its use has come to
196
be closely associated with particular goods in a relevant market.
In a recent decision, the Board of Appeals of the OHIM confirmed
197
the examiner’s decision that Andreas Stihl AG & Co KG’s color
mark was not inherently distinctive, but held that the mark had acquired
distinctive character under Article 7(3) of the CTMR. The Board of
Appeals relied mostly on survey evidence and other evidence on its
distribution channels in the Community submitted by Stihl, which
showed that it has used the mark in all of the relevant Member States of
the EU and that by far it is the market leader in the specific, definable
market segment of power-driven cut-off saws or hand-held
198
chainsaws.
The case by Stihl arose from an application to the OHIM in 2005
for a CTM under “class 7” for power tools, and claimed the colors
orange and grey; however, in 2007, the mark was refused registration
and the examiner argued that the mark “is devoid of any distinctive
199
character to distinguish the goods in question.” Stihl appealed the
decision and argued that
even a color per se can be inherently distinctive in exceptional
circumstances, and particularly where the number of goods . . . for
which the mark is claimed for [sic] is very restricted and the relevant
200
market is very specific.

196. Cf. Case R 355/2007-4, Andreas Stihl AG & Co. KG, Decision of the Fourth Board of
Appeal of 30 November 2009, ¶ 27, available at http://oami.europa.eu/LegalDocs/BoA/2007/en/
R0355_2007-4.pdf.
197. Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 48.
198. See id. ¶ 38.
199. Id. ¶ 6(d).
200. Id. ¶ 7(b).
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Having considered the inherent distinctiveness of the mark, the
OHIM Board of Appeal concluded that the combination of orange and
grey itself could not perform the function of a trade mark and that such
distinctiveness would have to have been acquired and the relevant
public would have to have become accustomed to the colors as a result
201
of “intense” use.
Article 7(3) CTMR not only requires intense use of the sign by the
appellant, but goes further than that. . . . The identification, by the
relevant public, of the product as originating from a given
undertaking must be the result of the use of the mark as a trade mark
and thus the result of the nature and effect of it, which make it
capable of distinguishing the products concerned from those of other
202
undertakings.

Stihl, in its appeal, claimed that the mark in question had acquired
distinctiveness in the Community through use within the meaning of
Article 7(3) of the CTMR, and consequently was eligible for
203
registration. The Board of Appeals was satisfied that the two market
surveys conducted in France and Germany were sufficient for acquired
204
distinctiveness.
These figures are impressive and come close to the maximum of
what can be reasonably obtained in a market survey . . . [and] shows
that the majority of the public not only recognises the colours and
205
sees them as a mark, but also has a strong affinity to the producer.

The Board of Appeals argued that at least one of the surveys
showed that Stihl acquired distinctiveness in both France and Germany,
and therefore could be
extrapolated to the other Member States of the Community under the
proviso that the amount of use is comparable so that it can be
expected that the same amount of use triggers the same consumer
206
recognition.

In concluding, the Board of Appeals said Stihl was “successful in
demonstrating that the subject-matter of the CTM application in
question has acquired distinctiveness . . . within the meaning of Article
207
7(3) CTMR.”
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. ¶ 26.
Stihl, supra note 196, ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 48.
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2. The ECJ and Acquired Distinctiveness in Slogans:
The Audi Decision
More recently, the ECJ had the opportunity to review the
requirements for distinctiveness in trade mark registration and its ruling
208
was of particular importance. In the Audi decision, the ECJ annulled
209
the General Court’s refusal to register as a CTM Audi’s ‘Vorsprung
210
durch Technik’ mark for a broad range of goods and services ranging
211
from jewelry to insurance (other than vehicles).
The sequence of events leading up to the Audi decision began in
the OHIM in 2003 when Audi applied for registration of ‘Vorsprung
212
durch Technik’ as a CTM under the various classes.
The OHIM
refused to register the word mark and argued that it constituted a form
of “descriptive advertising,” and as such is devoid of any distinctive
character in respect to those goods and services in the classes for which
213
it applied, but could be accepted for motor vehicles and components.
Audi challenged the findings of the OHIM, and the Board of
Appeal “considered that the distinction drawn by the examiner between
214
goods and services relating to technology was dubious.” The General
Court upheld the Board of Appeal decision, ruling that an advertising
slogan was “distinctive only if it could be immediately perceived as an
indication of the commercial origin of the goods or services in
215
question.” Audi appealed the decision to the ECJ to annul the General
216
Court’s decision.
The ECJ argued that “distinctive character must be assessed, first,
by reference to the goods or services in respect of which registration has
been applied for and, second, by reference to the relevant public’s
217
perception of the mark.”
But the Court directed most of its
observation to the word mark, stating that regarding “marks made up of
signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications
of quality or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by

208. Case C-398/08 P, Audi AG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 18 [hereinafter Audi II].
209. Case T-70/06, Audi AG v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks
and Designs) (OHIM), 2008 E.C.R. II-131.
210. Loosely translated as “advantage through technology” or “progress through technology.”
211. Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 4.
212. Id.
213. Id. ¶ 54.
214. Id. ¶ 9.
215. Id. ¶ 18.
216. Id. ¶ 1.
217. Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 34.
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those marks, registration of such marks is not excluded as such by virtue
218
of such use.” The Court, citing Merz & Krell and OHIM v. Erpo
Mobelwerk, said the distinctive character of such marks was
inappropriate to apply to slogan criteria which are stricter than those
219
applicable to other types of signs. The Court reasoned that,
while the criteria for the assessment of distinctive character are the
same for different categories of marks, it may be that, for the
purposes of applying those criteria, the relevant public’s perception
is not necessarily the same in relation to each of those categories and
it could therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness in
relation to marks of certain categories as compared with marks of
220
other categories.

The ECJ held that
difficulties in establishing distinctiveness which may be associated
with word marks consisting of advertising slogans because of their
very nature . . . do not justify laying down specific criteria
supplementing or derogating from the criterion of distinctiveness as
221
interpreted in [previous] case-law.

The ECJ was particularly harsh on the General Court regarding
what it perceived as an “erroneous interpretation” of the principles that
222
had been established by the case law. The Court said “the General
Court did not substantiate its findings to the effect that the mark applied
for will not be perceived by the relevant public as an indication of the
commercial origin of the goods and services in question” and “merely
highlighted the fact that [the] mark consists of, and is understood as, a
223
promotional formula.”
[I]t should be noted that the laudatory connotation of a word mark
does not mean that it cannot be appropriate for the purposes of
guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods or services which
it covers. Thus, such a mark can be perceived by the relevant public
both as a promotional formula and as an indication of the
commercial origin of goods or services. It follows that, in so far as
the public perceives the mark as an indication of that origin, the fact
that the mark is at the same time understood—perhaps even
218. Id. ¶ 35.
219. Id. (citing Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., 2001 E.C.R. I-6959, ¶ 40; Case
C-64/02 P, Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v.
Erpo Möbelwerk GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-10051, ¶ 41).
220. Id. ¶ 37.
221. Id. ¶ 38.
222. Id. ¶ 40.
223. Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 46.
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primarily understood—as a promotional formula has no bearing on
224
its distinctive character.

Equally, the ECJ said the analysis of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation
40/94 was misapplied by the General Court. According to the Court,
where such marks are not descriptive for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c),
“they can express an objective message . . . and still be capable of
indicating to the consumer the commercial origin of the goods or
225
services in question.” The aura of psychological impact was key to
how the ECJ framed the idea of an “objective message” when it stated
that, where the mark is not purely an ordinary advertising message, “but
possess[es] a certain originality or resonance, requiring at least some
interpretation by the relevant public, or setting off a cognitive process in
the minds of that public,” it can “express an objective message, even a
simple one, and still be capable of indicating to the consumer the
226
commercial origin of the good or service in question.”
Even if it were to be supposed that the slogan ‘Vorsprung durch
Technik’ conveys an objective message to the effect that
technological superiority enables the manufacture and supply of
better goods and services, that fact would not support the conclusion
that the mark applied for is devoid of any inherently distinctive
character. However simple such a message may be, it cannot be
categorized as ordinary to the point of excluding, from the outset and
without any further analysis, the possibility that that mark is capable
of indicating to the consumer the commercial origin of the goods or
227
services in question.

The ECJ then concluded that the slogan “exhibits a certain
228
originality and resonance which makes it easy to remember.” It has
been widely used by Audi for years, and as such, “it cannot be excluded
that the fact that members of the relevant public are used to establishing
the link between that slogan and [Audi] motor vehicles . . . also makes it
easier for that public to identify the commercial origin of the goods or
229
services covered.”
By its judgment in Audi, the ECJ essentially confirmed that
evidence of acquired distinctiveness is crucial to the assessment of

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 57.
Id.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 59.
Audi II, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 59.
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distinctiveness under the European trade mark regime. Similarly, in
Adidas v. Marca, the ECJ ruled that trade marks are a sign of origin and
231
as such the defendant’s mark was similar to that of the plaintiff.
V. ANTITRUST AND TRADE MARK RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ARTICLE 102 OF THE TFEU
Article 102 is one of the two main antitrust provisions of the
232
TFEU. Article 102 seeks to prevent the abuse of a dominant position,
such as a monopoly. Since a trade mark is in essence a legal monopoly,
the relationship between trade mark rights and Article 102 is an
important one. We are reminded of this important relationship in the
ECJ’s Arsenal case. In Arsenal, the ECJ held that trade mark rights
constitute an essential component in a system of undistorted
233
competition, which the TFEU intends to establish and maintain. In
contrast, in Magill the Court examined the substance of Article 102 and
234
intellectual property, notwithstanding its focus on copyright. Magill
involved an Article 102-based action by Independent Television
Publications, Ltd (ITP), Radio and Television of Ireland (RTE), and the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), seeking to enjoin Magill,
which allegedly abused its dominant position by publishing a
235
comprehensive weekly television guide.
In addition to case law such as Arsenal, the legal regime for trade
marks in the European Union is covered by the Trade Mark Directive

230. See generally id. ¶¶ 58–59.
231. Case C-102/07, Adidas v. Marca and Others, 2008 E.C.R. I-2439, ¶ 35.
In the present case, it must therefore be determined whether the average consumer,
when he sees sports or leisure garments featuring stripe motifs in the same places and
with the same characteristics as the stripes logo registered by Adidas, except for the
fact that they consist of two rather than three stripes, may be mistaken as to the origin
of those goods, believing that they are marketed by Adidas AG, Adidas Benelux BV or
an undertaking linked economically to those undertakings.
Id.
232. Articles 101 and 102 are the main antitrust provisions of the TFEU. Article 102
regulates abusive conducts “by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
internal market.” TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
233. Arsenal, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶ 47. See ¶ 48, where the Court of Justice states “[f]or the
trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the
Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services
bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is
responsible for their quality.”
234. See generally Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v.
Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-808.
235. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
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236

and the CTMR, and it is fair to argue that European trade mark law is
one of the most harmonized branches of law in the Union. The ECJ
frequently churns out trade mark cases interpreting the Trade Mark
237
Directive and the CTMR. Under Article 4 of the CTMR, the signs
that comprise a Community trade mark “[are] any signs capable of
being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their
packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
238
undertakings.”
The ECJ confirmed the legal effect of Article 4 in Henkel v.
239
OHIM. In Henkel, the Court held that based on Article 4, a product’s
shape and color clearly fall among the signs that may constitute a
240
241
Community trade mark.
The provisions of Article 7
of this
regulation are equally important. In OHIM v. Borco, the Court discusses
provisions of Article 7(1)(b), which states that trade marks devoid of
242
any distinctive character shall not be registered. The ECJ dismissed
236. CTMR, supra note 7; Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14.
237. See, e.g., Case C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R.
____ (delivered Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=81436&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212
665; Case C-263/09 P, Edwin Co. Ltd v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2011 E.C.R. ____ (delivered July 5, 2011), available at http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=106861&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mod
e=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212693; Case C-317/10, Union Investment Privatfonds v
UniCredito Italiano SpA, 2011 E.C.R. ____ (delivered June 16, 2011), available at http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=85093&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212712; Case C-96/09, Anheuser-Busch Inc., v Budejovicky
Budvar, 2011 E.C.R. ____ (delivered Mar. 29, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80814&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&oc
c=first&part=1&cid=212775; Case C-552/09, Ferrero SpA v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2011 E.C.R. ____ (delivered Mar. 24, 2011),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80741&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=212799.
238. CTMR, supra note 7, ¶ 4; see also Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 2.
239. Joined Cases C-456/01 & C-457/01 P, Henkel KGaA v. Office for Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶¶ 30–31.
240. Id. ¶ 31.
241. Article 7 of the Regulation lists the absolute grounds for refusal. See CTMR, supra note
7, art. 7. This list is comparable to the provisions of Article 3 of the Trademark Directive. See
Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 3.
242. See generally Case C-265/09 P, Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v. BORCO-Marken-Import Matthiesen GmbH & Co. KG., 2010
E.C.R. ____ (delivered Sept. 9, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=83142&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&pa
rt=1&cid=212903; see also CTMR, supra note 7, art. 7(1)(b); Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note
14, art. 3(1)(b) (“trademarks which are devoid of any distinctive character”).
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the appeal by the OHIM, however, which claimed that the provisions of
243
Article 7(1)(b) had been incorrectly applied. The Court applied its
examination of the distinctive character of a sign based on Article
244
7(1)(b).
In addition to the Trade Mark Directive and the CTMR, another
relevant piece of legislation that regulates Community trade marks is the
245
IP Enforcement Directive. The IP Enforcement Directive lists the
measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement
246
of intellectual property rights.
These pieces of legislation have a
common purpose in that they protect the monopoly rights of the trade
mark owner. Considering this protection, the competition rules set out in
Article 102 of the TFEU suggest that consumers (or potential market
entrants) can seek remedies under Article 102 specifically against the
monopoly rights of trade mark owners.
A. Monopoly Rights Conferred by Article 5 of the Trade Mark Directive
in the Context of Article 102 of the TFEU
The wording of Article 5 of the Trade Mark Directive, under the
heading “Rights conferred by a community trade mark,” is a clear signal
that trade mark rights are monopoly rights. The wording is as follows:
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive
rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the Community trade mark in
relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which
the Community trade mark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to the
Community trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or
services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of
confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign and
247
the trade mark . . . .

It could be deduced from the above provision of the Trade Mark
Directive that the mere conferral of such exclusive rights provides
monopoly rights. However, the Magill Court argued that the “mere

243. BORCO, 2010 E.C.R. ____, ¶ 20.
244. Id.
245. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16.
246. Id. art. 1.
247. Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 5(1)(a-b).
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ownership of an intellectual property right cannot offer such a
248
[dominant] position.”
Nonetheless, the Court said that where the
appellants enjoy a de facto monopoly over the information used to
compile listings for television programs they are “thus in a position to
prevent effective competition on the market in weekly television
249
magazines.” Thus, like the appellants in Magill, the exclusive rights
conferred by trade marks are also, arguendo, able to prevent effective
competition.
As Judge Friehe-Wich explained in a recent paper, “trade mark law
is competition law: like the proprietors of other IP rights, a trade mark
250
owner has an exclusive right.” There, the learned Judge succinctly
explained the nexus between trade mark law and competition law:
The justification for the monopoly rights of the trade mark proprietor
is that trade mark protection encourages enterprises to produce and
offer high quality goods that the consumer will recognize because of
its marking. Other undertakings are excluded from using the same
trade mark (and from using confusingly similar signs) so that they
may not exploit the reputation of the producer of the genuine goods
251
associated with a desirable, high-quality product.

This observation by Judge Friehe-Wich is similar to the view that
trade marks, unlike other intellectual property rights, “may be
perpetual, potentially lasting as long as does the underlying
goodwill.”252
What is more potent, however, is the fact that one could further
argue that trade mark law, though protecting the exclusive rights of the
owner, is also in fact preserving a monopoly. Indeed, Article 2 of the
Trade Marks Directive provides that a trade mark must be capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of
253
other undertakings, while the eleventh recital in the preamble to the
Directive states that the functioning of the protection conferred by the
254
mark is primarily to guarantee the indication of origin. This is crucial
for the trade mark to fulfill its essential role in the system of undistorted
competition which the TFEU seeks to establish; “it must offer a
248. RTE, 1995 E.C.R. I-808, ¶ 46.
249. Id. ¶ 47.
250. Karin Friehe-Wich, Infringement Litigation of Trade Marks 3 (Mar. 2, 2007) (lecture to
the European Patent Academy) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review).
251. Id.
252. Mandly, Jr., supra note 20, at 1320.
253. Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 2
254. Id. recital 11.
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guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have originated under
the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their
255
quality.”
The problem that arises from interpreting a trade mark as
guaranteeing origin and preventing undistorted competition is that it
also creates a new competition issue via the preservation of a monopoly,
256
which is prohibited under Article 102 of the TFEU. As seen in Sea
Containers v. Stena, a dominant undertaking, which owns or controls an
essential facility, refuses to grant access to competitors, and places the
competitors at a competitive disadvantage, infringes Article 102 of the
257
TFEU.
A product or service that possesses a large market share
through its trade mark, as the result of heavy marketing, for example, is
evidence that a dominant position exists. Case law has confirmed that a
market share of fifty percent is per se evidence of the existence of a
258
dominant position.
As the ECJ explained in Imperial Chemical
Industry v. Commission,
[an] undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for
some time, by means of the volume of production and the scale of
the supply which it stands for—without those having much smaller
market shares being able to meet rapidly the demand from those who
would like to break away from the undertaking which has the largest
market share—is by virtue of that share in a position of strength . . .
259
which is the special feature of a dominant position.

The Imperial Court further said that, a share of between seventy
percent and eighty percent is, in itself, “a clear indication of the
260
existence of a dominant position in the relevant market.” Arguendo,
where a trade mark owner has gained “a very large market share and
261
holds it for some time,” the proprietor may take steps to prevent a
262
competitor from registering similar marks. For example, Advocate

255. Id. ¶ 28.
256. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
257. Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to
Article 86 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.689—Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink—Interim Measures),
1994 O.J. (L 15) 8, ¶ 66.
258. See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439, ¶ 60.
259. Case T-66/01, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. II-02631, ¶ 256.
260. Id. ¶ 257 (citing Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-1441, ¶ 92 and
Joined Cases T-191, T-212 & T-214/98, Atl. Container Line v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. II3275, ¶ 907).
261. Imperial, 2010 E.C.R. II-02631, ¶ 256.
262. The grounds for refusal of an application are contained in Article 7 of the regulation. For
purposes of this article, the relevant sections are:
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General Mengozzi, in his recent opinion on Lego Juris, argued that
the monopoly conferred by a trade mark on a product may eliminate
competition in the market:
I have accepted that comparing the optional shapes is potentially
relevant in order to assess the state of competition . . . [and] it makes
sense in order to determine whether the monopoly conferred by a
trade mark on a product with certain functional characteristics may
264
eliminate competition in the market.

Lego Juris A/S appealed the General Court’s judgment of
November 12, 2008, holding that Lego Juris’s trade mark was
265
unenforceable against Mega Brands, their main competitor. The issue
on appeal to the ECJ was whether Lego Juris could register a trade mark
266
of “a photographic representation of a typical Lego brick.”
The dispute focused on whether the trade mark’s design contained
267
“essential characteristics of the shape of the brick.”
If so, the
functionality of these characteristics would have to “remain available to
any toy manufacturer,” therefore prohibiting Lego Juris from registering
268
the trade mark.
1. The following shall not be registered:
....
(b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character;
(c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may
serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, intended purpose, value,
geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the
service, or other characteristics of the goods or service;
....
(e) signs which consist exclusively of:
(i) the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves;
(ii) the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result;
(iii) the shape which gives substantial value to the goods;
....
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain
in only part of the Community.
3. Paragraph 1(b), (c) and (d) shall not apply if the trade mark has become distinctive
in relation to the goods or services for which registration is requested in consequence
of the use which has been made of it.
CMTR, supra note 7, art. 7.
263. Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. Office for
Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), available at http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=74742&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir
=&occ=first&cid=213859 [hereinafter Mengozzi Opinion].
264. Id. ¶ 96.
265. Case T-270/06, Lego Juris A/S v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2008 E.C.R. II-3117, ¶¶ 91–95.
266. Mengozzi Opinion, supra note 263, ¶ 3.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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On appeal, Lego Juris argued that the General Court infringed
Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 by incorrectly
interpreting the provision and incorrectly assessing the subject matter of
269
the mark. According to Lego Juris, Article 7(1)(e)(ii) does not intend
270
to “exclude functional shapes per se” from trade mark registration.
Rather, Lego Juris argued, the provision turns on “whether trade mark
protection would create a monopoly on technical solutions or the
271
functional characteristics of the shape in question.” When the ECJ
delivered its judgment, however, it said the monopoly issue was
“outside the scope of these proceedings,” and instead, examined the
272
case under the laws of unfair competition.
B. Monopoly in Trade Mark Protection: Lego and Philips
The ECJ dismissed the appeal in Lego and upheld the decisions of
the General Court and the Grand Board of Appeal of the OHIM
273
preventing the Lego brick’s being registered as a CTM. Lego Juris
argued the purpose behind Article 7(1)(e)(ii) was to prevent monopolies
274
on “technical solutions” or “functional characteristics.” Therefore, the
provision disallows registrations that would “illegitimately restrict
275
competitors,” but not all shapes that perform “a technical function.”
The ECJ pointed out that “‘technical solution’ should be
distinguished from the term ‘technical result’ in that a technical result
276
can be achieved by various solutions.” Therefore, according to the
ECJ,
the General Court . . . erred in law when it stated . . . that Article
7(1)(e)(ii) . . . precludes a shape from registration, even if the
technical result can be achieved by another shape using the same
technical solution. . . . The court failed to have regard to the fact that

269. Case C-48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade
Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2010 E.C.R. ____, ¶ 20 (delivered Sept. 14, 2010), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=82838&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=141229 [hereinafter Lego II]; CTMR, supra note
7, art. 7(1)(e)(ii).
270. Lego II, supra note 269, ¶ 21.
271. Id.
272. Id. ¶ 61.
273. Id. ¶ 87.
274. Id. ¶ 29.
275. Id. ¶ 29.
276. Lego II, supra note 269, ¶ 30.
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the availability of alternative shapes is highly relevant, since it
277
proves that there is no risk of creating a monopoly.

Mega Brands, on the other hand, argued that “registration of the
sign at issue as a trade mark would allow Lego Juris to prevent any
competitor from using, on the toy-brick market, the best, most
278
functional shapes.” In this regard, Mega Brands claimed that Lego
279
Juris “would regain the monopoly it once enjoyed under its patents.”
Furthermore, according to the OHIM, Lego Juris’s
argument is contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) . . .
[and] the inclusion of the words ‘exclusively’ and ‘necessary’ in that
provision does not imply that only shapes which are necessary as
such for the function sought are barred from registration. The ground
for refusal at issue covers all essentially functional shapes
280
attributable to the result.

In addition, the OHIM argued “if the appellant’s argument were
upheld, competitor’s freedom of access to alternative shapes would not
281
be guaranteed.”
If a trade mark registration were obtained in respect of a specific
shape, the appellant could then successfully prevent not only any
identical shape, but also similar shapes. That would include, for
example, bricks with slightly higher or wider projections than the
282
Lego brick.

277. Id. ¶ 31.
278. Id. ¶ 33.
279. Id. ¶ 33 (“[T]he General Court failed to have regard to the fact, that, often, the same
patented invention may be created with several shapes.”); see also id. ¶ 34 (“While accepting that
mere disclosure of a shape in a patent is not by itself a bar to the shape being registered as a trade
mark, Mega Brands observes that such a disclosure can nevertheless be evidence that the shape is
indeed functional.”).
280. Id. ¶ 35 (“[B]y restricting the ground for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of
Regulation No 40/94 to signs which consist ‘exclusively’ of the shape of goods which is
‘necessary’ to obtain a technical result, the legislature duly took into account that any shape of
goods is, to a certain extent, functional and that it would therefore be inappropriate to refuse to
register a shape of goods as a trade mark solely on the ground that it has functional
characteristics. By the terms ‘exclusively’ and ‘necessary’, that provision ensures that solely
shapes of goods which only incorporate a technical solution, and whose registration as a trade
mark would therefore actually impede the use of that technical solution by other undertakings, are
not to be registered.”); see also Lego II, supra note 269, ¶ 48.
281. Id. ¶ 36.
282. Id.

364

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 33:321

The ECJ began its analysis in Lego by citing cases such as Arsenal,
Alcon, and Merz and declaring that trade mark law constitutes an
283
essential element of the system of competition in the EU.
In that system, each undertaking must, in order to attract and retain
customers by the quality of its goods or services, be able to have
registered as trade marks signs enabling the consumer, without any
possibility of confusion, to distinguish those goods or services from
284
others which have another origin.

In considering the argument that the provision of Article 7(1)(e)(ii)
has been interpreted too broadly and incorrectly by the General Court
and the Grand Board of Appeal, the ECJ said the underlying interest of
that provision is to prevent trade mark law which grants an undertaking
monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a
285
product. The Court then said
the inclusion in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 40/94 of the
prohibition on registration as a trade mark of any sign consisting of
the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result
ensures that undertakings may not use trade mark law in order to
indefinitely perpetuate exclusive rights relating to technical
286
solutions.

The ECJ concluded that the arguments of Lego Juris, that the
provisions of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) were interpreted incorrectly, “cannot be
287
upheld.”
[T]he position of an undertaking which has developed a technical
solution cannot be protected—with regard to competitors placing on
the market slavish copies of the product shape incorporating exactly
the same solution—by conferring a monopoly on that undertaking
through registering as a trade mark the three-dimensional sign
consisting of that shape, but can, where appropriate, be examined in
288
the light of rules on unfair competition.

The ECJ also dismissed Lego Juris’s arguments concerning the
application of incorrect criteria in the identification of the essential

283. Id. ¶ 38 (citing Arsenal, 2002 E.C.R. I-10299, ¶¶ 47–48; Case C-412/05 P, Alcon Inc. v.
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), 2007 E.C.R.
I-3569, ¶¶ 53–54; Merz, 2001 E.C.R. I-6959, ¶¶ 21–22).
284. Id.
285. Lego II, supra note 269, ¶ 43.
286. Id. ¶ 45.
287. Id. ¶ 62.
288. Id. ¶ 61.
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289

characteristics of a shape of a mark.
Instead, the Court said the
correct application of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) requires that the essential
characteristics of the three-dimensional sign must be properly identified
by the authority deciding the application to register the sign as a trade
290
mark.
Importantly, the Advocate General struck the tone that makes the
Lego judgment crucial to the argument that trade mark protection
perpetuates monopolies. The Advocate General observed that the appeal
was the Court’s second opportunity in ten years to explore the
intricacies of Article 7(1)(e)(ii), “which justifies the attempt to provide a
reply which goes beyond the limits imposed by the grounds of the
291
appeal.”
In Philips v. Remington, which concerned the graphic
representation of the head shape of an electric razor designed by
292
Philips, the Court set the tone for what was to come in the Lego
293
294
295
decision. The Philips case interpreted Articles 3(1), 3(3), 5(1),

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
in part:

Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 68.
Mengozzi Opinion, supra note 263, at ¶ 53.
Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶¶ 11–12.
The Grounds for Refusal or Invalidity under Article 3 of the Trade Mark Directive state,

The following shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared
invalid:
....
(b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character;
(c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in
trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical
origin, or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other
characteristics of the goods or services;
(d) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which have become
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the
trade;
(e) signs which consist exclusively of:
(i) the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves;
(ii) the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result;
(iii) the shape which gives substantial value to the goods . . . .
Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 3(1).
294. Id. art. 3(3) (“A trade mark shall not be refused registration or be declared invalid in
accordance with paragraph 1(b), (c) or (d) if, before the date of application for registration and
following the use which has been made of it, it has acquired a distinctive character. Any Member
State may in addition provide that this provision shall also apply where the distinctive character
was acquired after the date of application for registration or after the date of registration.”)
295. See id., supra note 14, art. 5(1).
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296

and 6(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Directive. Similar to Article 7 of the
297
CTMR, Article 3 of the Trade Marks Directive lists the grounds that a
298
trade mark can be refused for invalid registration. Philips argued that
it had acquired a de facto monopoly, and as such, distinctiveness, by
fulfilling the criterion in Article 3(3) of the Directive. Specifically,
Philips argued that because of its extensive use of a particular shape,
both the relevant trade industry and the public at large associate goods
299
of that shape with a particular undertaking.
The Court was cautious and held that the factual analysis should
focus on relevant matters in cases involving a monopoly supplier of
300
goods. In an earlier opinion, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
expressed his skepticism of Philips’ arguments when he said that
“nothing would stop an undertaking from registering as trade marks all
imaginable shapes which achieved such a result, thus obtaining a
301
permanent monopoly over a particular technical solution.” The U.K.,
as a party to the dispute, also argued “the requirements of Article 3(3)
are not satisfied where the public’s recognition has come about not
because of the trade mark but because of the monopoly on the supply of
302
the goods.”
The Commission of the European Communities
303
concurred with the U.K.’s reasoning in a similar submission. It noted
that as long as a large portion of the relevant public associate a trade
mark with a particular undertaking, the requirements of Article 3(3) are
304
satisfied regardless of the means of distinction.
Moreover, in interpreting Article 3(1)(e) of the Trade Marks
Directive, the Commission noted that if other shapes readily available to
competitors can obtain the same technical result, then denying
registration does not impose unreasonable restraint on industry and

296. “[I]ndications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value,
geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other
characteristics of goods or services.” Id. art. 6(1)(b).
297. CTMR, supra note 7, art. 7.
298. See Directive 2008/95/EC, supra note 14, art. 3.
299. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶ 52 (Philips argued that “a long-standing de facto
monopoly on products with the relevant shape is important evidence which supports the
acquisition of distinctiveness. If a trader wishes to base an application for registration upon
distinctiveness acquired through use, a de facto monopoly is almost a prerequisite for such
registration.”)
300. Id. ¶ 53.
301. Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV
v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-5478, ¶ 39.
302. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶ 54.
303. Id. ¶ 56.
304. Id.
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innovation.
Philips rebutted this assertion by submitting that the
purpose of Article 3(1)(e) was to use trade mark protection to prevent
306
monopolies.
The ECJ, however, established the criterion as “the
availability of alternative shapes to achieve the desired technical result”
in light of legislative history and its desire to construe exceptions
307
narrowly. The Court further explained that
the rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in
Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive is to prevent trade mark protection
from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or
functional characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek
in the products of competitors. Article 3(1)(e) is thus intended to
prevent the protection conferred by the trade mark right from being
extended, beyond signs which serve to distinguish a product or
service from those offered by competitors, so as to form an obstacle
preventing competitors from freely offering for sale products
incorporating such technical solutions or functional characteristics in
308
competition with the proprietor of the trade mark.

This reasoning led the Court to conclude that the provisions of
Article 3(1)(e) “must be interpreted to mean that a sign consisting
exclusively of the shape of a product is unregistrable by virtue thereof if
it is established that the essential functional features of that shape are
309
attributable only to the technical result.”
C. Further Evidence from the ECJ of Monopoly Rights in Trade Marks
The remainder of this section further examines some of the other
cases from the ECJ where the issue of monopoly (market dominance)
and trade mark goods collided, and considers how the court treated
these issues within the realm of competition law, in particular Article
102 of the TFEU. The approach of this article is through the lens of law
and economics; therefore, it is important to note that monopoly power
and market power are often used differently by economists and
310
lawyers. The discussion will begin with the current legal regime for
305. Id. ¶¶ 66–67.
306. Id. ¶ 67.
307. Id. ¶ 72.
308. Philips, 2002 E.C.R. I-5490, ¶ 78.
309. Id. ¶ 84; see also points 1–4 of the ruling.
310. For instance, economists use both ‘monopoly power’ and ‘market power’ to refer to the
power of a single firm or group of firms to price profitably above marginal cost. For a similar
discussion of the economic meaning of market power and monopoly power, see, e.g., F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 14–16 (2d ed.
1980).
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monopoly and later explore how the courts often define market
311
power.
Two sets of legal regulations that mirror the same content serve as
the most tangible doctrines regulating monopolies, thereby curbing
312
market power. These sets of regulations are embedded in Article 102
313
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To understand the construction of
market power in the law, one must first understand the legal context in
which it is shaped.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act deems it illegal to “monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
314
several States, or with foreign nations.”

311. For a comparative discussion, see Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of
Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of Economics: The U.S./E.U. Divide, 3 UTAH. L. REV. 725
(2006).
312. The Lisbon Treaty was entered into force on 1 December 2009 and several articles,
including the antitrust provisions, were renumbered (the former Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty are
now Articles 101 and 102 respectively). See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 17; see also TFEU,
supra note 19. For the ease of reference this article will use both the prior reference of the EC
Treaty in addition to the new numbering in the Lisbon Treaty.
313. Sherman Antitrust Act, § 2, supra note 46. For instance, in the recent Trinko case the
U.S. Supreme Court held that firms with market power are not necessarily required to share its
property with its competitors. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). The Supreme Court stated that:
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them
uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of
their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those
economically beneficial facilities. Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—
a role for which they are ill suited. Moreover, compelling negotiation between
competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antirust: collusion.
The Trinko decision arguably reflects the primacy of the incentive theory in justifying intellectual
property, like prior case law in the United States. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954), where the Supreme Court explained that:
“The copyright law, like patent statutes, make reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.” (Citations omitted.) However, it is “intended definitely to grant
valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome
requirements: ‘to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or
artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.’” (Citations omitted.) The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that . . . [it] is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Id.
314. Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 46, § 2.
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Under the TFEU any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
315
dominant position will fall afoul of the treaty. The requirements of
Article 102 of the TFEU can be categorized as (a) a dominant position,
(b) abuse, (c) which affects trade between Member States, (d) in a
substantial part of the Common Market, and (e) by one or more
316
undertakings.
The first requirement of a dominant position is
317
connected to the construction of market power. The determination of
dominance by a firm requires a number of tests, including the definition
318
319
of the relevant market.
In addition to the relevant market,
an
assessment of dominance will also take into account the competitive
structure of the market, such as expansion, entry, and countervailing
320
buying power.
The first step in the application of Article 102 is an assessment of
whether a firm is in a dominant position and the degree of market power
321
it holds.
In United Brands v. Commission of the European

315. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.
316. Id.
317. See Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 10 [hereinafter Guidance on Article 82]:
Dominance has been defined under European Community law as a position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on a relevant market, by affording it the power to behave
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately
of consumers.
Id.; see also Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, ¶ 38. Note that
Article 82 of the TEC has now been renamed Article 102 of the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 19,
art. 102. Cf. TEC, supra note 19, art. 82.
318. The European Commission, for instance, has issued a Notice on the Definition of
Relevant Market for the purposes of Community Competition law, which states:
Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition
between firms. It serves to establish the framework within which competition policy is
applied by the Commission. The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a
systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face. The
objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension is to
identify those actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of
constraining their behavior and of preventing them from behaving independently of an
effective competitive pressure. It is from this perspective, that the market definition
makes it possible, inter alia, to calculate market shares that would convey meaningful
information regarding market power for the purposes of assessing dominance or for the
purposes of applying Article [85].
Commission Notice 97/3, 1997 O.J. (372) 1, ¶ 2 (EU).
319. Market shares provide a useful first indication for the Commission of the market
structure and of the relative importance of the various undertakings active on the market. See
AKZO, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439, ¶ 60; Case T-340/03, Fr. Télécom, 2007 E.C.R. II-107, ¶ 100.
320. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 12.
321. Id. ¶ 9.
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Communities, the ECJ defined “dominance” as “a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
322
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”
Various case law has also shown that a dominant position derives
from a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not
323
necessarily determinative. This is particularly apparent in examining
the relevant markets for medicinal pharmaceutical products.
1. Lelos v. Glaxo: Abuse of Dominance Under Article 102
This section will discuss the recent Lelos v. Glaxo judgment by the
324
ECJ regarding the interpretation of Article 102 of the TFEU. On
September 16, 2008, the ECJ held that Article 102 must be interpreted
as meaning that an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the
relevant market for medicinal products is abusing its dominant position
if it refuses to meet the ordinary orders by wholesalers in order to
325
prevent parallel exports.
i. The main question referred to the court and surrounding facts
The Greek courts asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on
whether or not it is an abuse of a dominant position in violation of
Article 102 for a pharmaceuticals company occupying such a position
on the national market to refuse to fill orders by wholesalers who are
326
engaged in parallel exports. The facts surrounding the case involved
the Greek subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline plc, GSK AEVE which
imports, warehouses, and distributes pharmaceutical products of the
GSK group in Greece. It also holds “the marketing authorization in
327
Greece” for the medicinal products involved in the dispute.
The other applicants to the dispute had for a number of years
bought those medicinal products from GSK AEVE for local distribution

322. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 65.
323. See, e.g., Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-Klim Grovvareforening v. Dansk Landbrugs
Grovvareselskab AmbA (DLG), 1994 E.C.R. I-5671, ¶ 47.
324. See generally Joined Cases C-468 & C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE v.
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139.
325. See also Press Release No. 65/08, Judgment of the Court of Justice in Cases C-468/06 to
C-478/06 (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/
2009-03/cp080065en.pdf.
326. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 28.
327. Id. ¶ 9.
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328

and export to other Member States of the EU. Towards the end of
October 2000, GSK AEVE altered its system of distribution in the
Greek market, citing a shortage of the medicinal products in the dispute.
From November 6, 2000, GSK AEVE stopped meeting the orders of the
appellants and began to distribute those products to Greek hospitals and
329
pharmacies through the company Farmacenter AE.
Lelos, its coapplicants, and other Greek pharmaceutical wholesalers applied to the
Greek Competition Commission for a declaration that the sales policy of
GSK AEVE and its parent company in respect of the medicinal products
constituted an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 and
330
corresponding Greek antitrust laws.
The Greek Competition Commission issued an interim ruling on
August 3, 2001, that GSK AEVE should meet the orders of the
331
applicants for medicinal products pending a final decision. However,
GSK AEVE lodged an application with the Administrative Appeal
332
Court for a stay of execution and an annulment of that decision. The
333
court rejected the application.
The Greek Court of First Instance in the Lelos v. Glaxo saga, held
in 2003 that GSK AEVE’s refusal to supply was justified and could not
334
constitute an abuse of its dominant position. The case was appealed to
the Court of Appeal in Athens, which then referred it to the ECJ for a
335
preliminary ruling. Before the ECJ ruling, the Greek Competition
Commission on September 6, 2006, ruled that GSK AEVE did not
occupy a dominant position on the market for two of its medicinal
336
products but found it did hold a dominant position for one.

328. Id. ¶ 10. Co-applicants to the dispute were Farmakemporiki AE Emporias kai Dianomis
Farmakeftikon Proionton (C-469/06); Konstantinos Xidias kai Sia OE (C-470/06);
Farmakemporiki AE Emporias kai Dianomis Farmakeftikon Proionton (C-471/06); Ionas
Stroumsas EPE (C-472/06); Ionas Stroumsas EPE (C-473/06); Farmakemporiki Farma-Group
Messinias AE (C-474/06); K.P. Marinopoulos AE Emporias kai Dianomis Farmakeftikon
Proionton (C-475/06); K.P. Marinopoulos AE Emporias kai Dianomis Farmakeftikon Proionton
(C-476/06); Kokkoris D. Tsanas K. EPE and Others (C-477/06); Kokkoris D. Tsanas K. EPE and
Others (C-478/06) listed in Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139.
329. Id. ¶ 11.
330. The corresponding provision of Article 82 in Greek law was laid down in Diatagma
(1977:703) Peri elegxoymonopwliwn kai oligopwliwn kai prostasias toy eleygerry antagwnismoy
[On Monopolies and Oligopolies Control and Protection of Free Competition] Government
Gazette [FEK A’] 1977, A:278 (Greece).
331. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 16.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. ¶ 20.
335. Id. ¶ 23.
336. Id. ¶ 24.
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ii. Market power in pharmaceuticals: The law and economics of a
refusal to supply as analyzed in Lelos v. Glaxo
There are few cases involving intellectual property rights and the
337
abuse of dominance in the EU. Lelos v. Glaxo did not depart from the
established case law on abuse of dominance. The existence of a
dominant position is one of the key requirements for a violation of
338
Article 102 of the TFEU. In Lelos v. Glaxo, the ECJ cited its own
case law and explained that a refusal to supply by an undertaking with a
dominant position on the market of a given product constitutes an abuse
339
of dominance under Article 102 of the TFEU.
In a style typical of the ECJ, the Court addressed the issue in two
parts. The first issue was whether such behavior constituted a refusal to
supply, liable to eliminate competition. If so, the second issue was
340
whether the refusal to supply was abusive. The court stressed the
entrenched case law and observed that a dominant undertaking’s refusal
to meet the orders of an existing customer, without objective
justification, is abusive if that conduct is liable to eliminate a
341
competitor.
The court further observed that though a firm has a legitimate right
to protect its commercial interest, if it is attacked, “such behaviour
cannot be accepted if its purpose is specifically to strengthen the
342
dominant position and abuse it.” The ECJ in Lelos v. Glaxo gradually,
and in line with the Guidance on the Application of Article 82
343
(Guidance on Article 82),
attempted to apply a more economics
344
effects-based approach to its case law. The Guidance on Article 82
337. See generally Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v.
Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-808; Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039; Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
338. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 49.
339. See, e.g., Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission,
1974 E.C.R. 223, ¶ 25 [hereinafter Commercial Solvents] and United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207,
¶ 183.
340. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 34.
341. Id. (citing Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223, ¶ 25 and United Brands, 1978 E.C.R.
207, ¶ 183).
342. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 50; see also United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 189.
343. See Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317. Article 82 under the old Treaty is now
Article 102 of the TFEU. Id.
344. The economics or effects-based approach to Article 102 stemmed from a 2005 report,
which the Commission published, that called for a more effects-based approach to case law. The
report argued in favor of an economics-based approach to Article 82 (now Article 102), similar to
the reform of Article 81 (now Article 101) and merger control. See ECON. ADVISORY GRP. FOR
COMPETITION POLICY, AN ECONOMICS APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, 2 (2005) [hereinafter
EAGCP REPORT]. The thinking was that an economics-based approach, according to the report,
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ushered in an increased degree of legal clarity with regard to the
analytical framework of dominant firms’ conduct under Article 102 of
345
the TFEU. In Lelos v. Glaxo, however, the application of economic
effect was ambiguous, leaving room for further interpretation and
clearer application of economic analysis. In fact, the court did not apply
substantive economic arguments to its ruling or utilize any
comprehensive survey regarding the market share of the GSK Group.
The closest mention by the Court of the overall market share, and
thus market power, was the agreement by GSK AEVE following
discussions with the Greek Competition Commission to “deliver
quantities of medicines equivalent to national consumption plus
346
18%.” In addition, the Greek National Organization for Medicines
published a circular on November 27, 2001, which compelled
pharmaceutical companies and all distributors of medicines to deliver
the equivalent of those required for prescription medicines plus twenty347
five percent. The ECJ took these economic factors into consideration,
however the court did not perform sufficient economic analysis,
especially in light of the Guidance on Article 82.

“will naturally lend itself to a rule of reason approach to competition policy, since careful
consideration of the specifics of each case is needed, and this is likely to be especially difficult
under per se rules.” (internal quotations omitted). EAGCP REPORT, at 3. On December 19, 2005,
the European Commission published a discussion paper on the application of Article 82 to
exclusionary abuses, which covered, inter alia, the assessment of dominance, a framework for
analysis of exclusionary abuses, and a proposed individual approach to each of the four main
types of exclusionary abuse. See DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article
82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. Following the consultations in February 2009, the Commission
published a guidance on the application of Article 82, to which the courts have since turned when
assessing violations under Article 82. See Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317. Guidance on
Article 82 covers the application of Article 82 to exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings,
which addresses specific abuses such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, predation, refusal
to supply, and margin squeeze. Id. For criticisms of Guidance on Article 82, see, e.g., John
Temple Lang, Article 82 EC—The Problems and the Solution 6–23 (Aug. 27, 2009), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/54282/2/65-09.pdf; Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc
v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 69 (The judgment states that there is a need to examine
“whether there is an objective economic justification for the discounts and bonuses granted.”).
345. The Guidance on Article 82 states,
[a]longside the Commission’s specific enforcement decisions, it is intended to provide
greater clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of analysis which
the Commission employs in determining whether it should pursue cases concerning
various forms of exclusionary conduct and to help undertakings better assess whether
certain behavior is likely to result in intervention by the Commission under Article 82.
Guidance on Article 2, supra note 317, ¶ 2.
346. Lélos, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 14.
347. Id. ¶ 17.
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iii. Lelos v. Glaxo: The ECJ’s old religion
Lelos v. Glaxo was an important case that the ECJ decided during
348
the reform process of Article 102.
As shown above, the reform
process of Article 102 advocates a more effects-based approach to
proceedings involving Article 102, but the case was decided using the
same old per se approach. That is, the court used the form-based
approach and did not employ the rule of reason approach in any
349
substantive way. The court stuck to what it believed to be best, its old
religion of form-based approach, rather than ushering in the effectsbased approach with extensive economic analysis.
This approach by the ECJ suggests that the law on abuse of market
350
power is far from settled. One may argue that analyses, which rely on
qualitative and quantitative evidence, such as one assessing harm to the
consumer, are time-consuming. If the goal of the court was for the
tenets of the Article 102 reform to be taken seriously, however, it failed
to do so. The ECJ in Lelos v. Glaxo did not use empirical arguments,
which could have utilized a more effects-based approach in line with the
351
Guidance on Article 82.
2. AstraZeneca: Trade Mark Branding and Market Entry
Can antitrust rules be flouted in order to keep a competitor off the
market for generic drugs? In short, the answer is yes. With innovative
branding and abuse of a dominant position, a patent holder may be able
to achieve such a goal. This was seen in AstraZeneca, regarding
352
Omeprazole, marketed as Prilosec and Losec.
“Brands, and by
348. Frances Murphy & Francesco Liberatore, The European Commission’s Guidance on the
Application of Article 82 EC (Jun. 25, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.
asp?id=6883&nid=6. Several cases and Commission decisions on Article 82 were decided since
the Commission’s discussion paper was published and leading up to the adoption of the Guidance
on Article 82. See, e.g., Case T-340/03, Fr. Télécom v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-107;
Summary of Commission Decision of 11 October 2007 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/B-1/37.966—Distrigaz), 2008 O.J. (C 9) 5.
349. For a discussion on the rule of reason approach, see, e.g., Claudia Desogus, Parallel
Trade and Pharmaceutical R&D: The Pitfalls of the Rule of Reason, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 649 (2008).
350. For more on this, see, e.g., John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244,
F248 (2005).
351. See also EAGCP REPORT, supra note 344, at 13 (stating that effects-based approach
requires the verification of competitive harm).
352. See generally Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. ____
(delivered July 1, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&
docid=82135&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=149187
[hereinafter AstraZeneca]. The General Court’s decision concerns the Commission decision of
June 2005 that imposed a fine of €60 million on AstraZeneca for misusing the patent and the
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extension trademarks, . . . are an important weapon in the arsenal of
competition,” because they can promote competitiveness and cause
353
competition infringements. The legal definition of a trade mark was
354
discussed above, and as Lopes and Duguid observe, “[a] trademark is
then that aspect of the brand that can gain legal protection through
355
356
registration.” Despite a broad approach to the concept of a brand
357
(and trade marks), Lopes and Duguid acknowledge “brands, as a kind
of monopoly, can distort markets, inhibit innovation, provide
358
unreasonable barriers to entry, and promote rent-seeking behaviour.”
Despite anti-competitive functions of brands, it is not necessarily
the case that that they are addressed by either competition law or trade
mark law. Both trade mark law and competition law address business
competition. As a recent paper points out: “[O]ne might expect [trade
mark and competition law] to address brands as they fit into each
doctrine’s areas of concern and that together trademark and antitrust law
would offer a coherent legal regime to manage the way in which brands
359
affect competition.” Desai and Waller submit that “trademark law
fails to recognize that trademarks are only a subset of a business’
360
broader brand strategy in the real world.”
procedures for marketing pharmaceutical products to prevent or delay the market entry of
competing medicinal products. Id. ¶¶ 1–9. See Press Release, Competition: Commission Fines
AstraZeneca €60 Million for Misusing Patent System to Delay Market Entry of Competing
Generic Drugs, IP/05/737 (June 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/05/737 [hereinafter Commission Press Release].
353. TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS 1 (Teresa da Silva Lopes & Paul
Duguid eds., 2010). The authors argue that the general definition of a brand as a name, term,
symbol, or design (or combination of these) is “used by a firm to identify its goods or services
and differentiate them from the competition.” Id.
354. See CTMR, supra note 7, art. 4.
355. TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 353 at 1.
356. See, e.g., Desai & Waller, supra note 79, at 1449 (“Brands are complex strategic tools
that perform a variety of functions including creating demand, circumventing middlemen so that a
company can reach consumers directly, controlling prices, managing quality, providing a
platform for trademark enforcement, defining national identities, and satisfying a consumer’s
emotional and psychological needs. These functions, separately and in combination, allow a
company to differentiate products, avoid commoditization of its products or services, and
distinguish the company and its goods or services from its competition, thus building loyal
customer bases for whom no other brand or item will suffice.”)
357. See, e.g., TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE (Lionel
Bently, Jennifer Davis & Jane C. Ginsburg eds. 2008) xv.
358. TRADEMARKS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 353 at 1.
359. Desai & Waller, supra note 79, at 1425–26.
360. Id. at 1428. Desai and Waller further argue that a successful brand encompasses more
than a source and quality functions. They contend that “trademark law is incomplete” because it
“regulates only a fraction” of the real business behavior that matters, and the claimed “protection
for a mark, first subtly . . . has transformed into protection for a brand.” Id. at 1429.
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When the General Court upheld a decision by the European
361
Commission that AstraZeneca was abusing its dominant position by
362
adopting strategies designed to delay or limit generic entry, the court
said that though the “abuse is novel,” such practices were “manifestly
363
contrary to competition on the merits.”
Clearly, therefore, lurking between the lines in this judgment were
concerns about the branding of a drug, widely known on the European
364
markets as Losec, by AstraZeneca with the use of “novel” strategies
that were limiting competitors’ entry into the relevant generic drug
365
market and infringing Article 102 of the TFEU. AstraZeneca blocked
or delayed parallel imports and generic entry to a number of markets in
the EU and the European Economic Area and thus abused its dominance
366
in the proton pump inhibitor (PPI), the relevant product market.
A fine was imposed on AstraZeneca, which it appealed in
367
September 2005.
An oral hearing took place before the Sixth
Chamber of the General Court on November 26 and 27, 2008, when the

361. Commission Press Release, supra note 352. The fine imposed on AstraZeneca was for
two abuses of a dominant position contrary to Article 102 TFEU.
362. The first abuse was that AstraZeneca engaged in a pattern of deliberate
misrepresentation to national courts and patent offices in order to obtain SPC for Losec
(omeprazole), between 1993 and 2000, the so called SPC abuse. The second abuse was that in
1998/1999, AstraZeneca operated a strategy of selectively withdrawing its Losec capsules,
replacing them with Losec tablets, and requesting deregistration of the marketing authorizations
for the capsules in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the so called “deregistration abuse.” See
AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 8.
363. Id. ¶ 901.
364. The active substance in Losec is omeprazole, a proton pump inhibitor (PPI) used in
treating gastro-intestinal acid-related conditions. Id. ¶ 62.
365. Id. ¶ 7. The first alleged abuse consisted of a pattern of allegedly misleading
representations made before the patent offices in a number of European countries in which
AstraZeneca operates and the national Courts in Germany and Norway. The second alleged
abused consisted of the submission for requests for deregistration of the marketing authorizations
for Losec capsules in Scandinavia, combined with the withdrawal from the market of Losec
capsules and the launch of Losec MUPS tablets in those territories. See id. ¶ 8.
366. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 70–71. The court upheld the Commission’s finding of
national markets for PPI’s, stating, “[The] finding is to a large extent supported by the statements
of the medical experts submitted by the applicants during the administrative procedure . . . that
PPIs were generally used to treat the severe forms of the conditions while H2 blockers were
reserved more for their milder forms.” The General Court further explained that PPIs and H2
blockers were prescribed to treat the same conditions and that both constituted first-line
treatments. See id. ¶ 151.
367. Id. ¶ 10. See also Commission Decision 332/24, 2006 O.J. (L 857) 2 (EC). The 60
million euro fine was reduced by the General Court because the Commission had failed to
establish that deregistration of the Losec capsule marketing authorization was capable of
restricting parallel imports of Losec capsules. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶¶ 865, 920.2.
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parties presented oral arguments.
The General Court, after an
extensive analysis of the case, essentially summed up its arguments by
stating that AstraZeneca cannot
use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or make more
difficult the entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of
grounds relating to the defense of the legitimate interests of an
undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence
369
of objective justification.

The General Court acknowledged that “brand loyalty” derives from
370
“past reputation or advertising.”
In the background of this decision was the fact that the burden of
proof was on the Commission to demonstrate that AstraZeneca was in a
dominant position by examining the relevant product market, which was
371
constituted of AstraZeneca’s PPIs.
The court said that doctors’
prescribing practice was characterized by a certain “inertia,” and the
applicants argued that in the pharmaceutical sector, competition takes
place primarily at the level of innovation rather than at the level of
372
price.
Thus, it was the Commission in its arguments that
acknowledged that the “inertia” of the prescribing practice is an
exogenous characteristic of the market, unrelated to competition on
the merits, which autonomously dampens demand for a new product.
Thus, ‘inertia’ on the part of prescribing doctors cannot be regarded
as a competitive constraint imposed by H2 blockers, akin to brand
373
loyalty generated by past reputation or advertising.

The reference to H2 blockers is part of the dispute regarding the
definition of the relevant product market and the competitive interaction
374
of H2 blockers (also known as ‘antihistamines’) with PPIs.
The
Court was more succinct about Losec’s brand image: “Losec enjoyed a

368. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 19. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations (EFPIA) intervened in the dispute. Id. ¶ 21.
369. Id. ¶ 672.
370. Id. ¶ 56.
371. Id. ¶ 28. See also Commission Notice 97/3, 1997 O.J. (372) ¶¶ 1–6 (EU). As the court
said, for the purposes of investigating the possibly dominant position of an undertaking, the
possibilities of competition must be judged in the context of the market comprising the totality of
the products. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 31. To this effect the court cited, for example, Case
T-219/99, British Airways v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917. Id. ¶ 91.
372. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶¶ 34, 41.
373. Id. ¶ 56.
374. See id. ¶ 62 for a full description.
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solid brand image and reputation on account of its status of ‘first
375
product on the market,’ and had the most experience behind it.”
Furthermore, in establishing the factual context of the second
abuse of a dominant position identified by the Commission, the court
cited documents which identified “key actions to minimize sales erosion
following patent expiry” and develop “products with significant medical
benefits/differential to compete with cheap generic omeprazole . . . and
376
to retain price and volume.”
The court explained that “[the]
diversification of the brand before patent expiry is intended to protect
sales in the short- to medium-term after that expiry through customer
377
loyalty/use habits in the absence of similar generic products.”
Another internal document stated that the switch from capsules to
tablets would “vitalise the Losec brand” and that the switch was
“intended to increase the protection of the . . . brand ([against] future
378
generics) and make the brand more competitive.” Nonetheless, the
court found
no reason to reproach [AstraZeneca] either for launching Losec
[tablets] or for withdrawing Losec capsules from the market, since
those acts were not such to raise the legal barriers to entry
complained of by the Commission that were capable of delaying or
preventing the introduction of generic products and parallel
379
imports.
380

The reference to brand loyalty by the ECJ is a subtle reference to
381
AstraZeneca’s use of umbrella branding
to move ahead of its
competitors and to gain doctors’ reliance on Losec’s “solid brand
382
image.” Umbrella branding—“the practice of selling several products
383
under the same brand name” —is used widely within several
375. Id. ¶ 278.
376. Id. ¶ 762.
377. Id. ¶ 763.
378. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 775.
379. Id. ¶ 811.
380. Id. ¶ 56.
381. See CHINMAYA PADHI, ET AL., BUSINESS INSIGHTS, THE OTC OUTLOOK FOR 2007
(2003) 116, 138, available at http://www.globalbusinessinsights.com/rbi/content/rbhc0090t.pdf
(last visited Jan. 29, 2012); Luís M.B. Cabral, Umbrella Branding with Imperfect Observability
and Moral Hazard, 27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 206, 206 (2009). The terms ‘brand stretching’ and
‘brand extension’ are used often in the literature. For more discussions on umbrella branding, see,
for example, Chong Ju Choi & Carlo Scarpa, Credible Spatial Preemption Through Reputation
Extension, 10 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 439, 440 (1992); Fredrik Andersson, Pooling Reputations, 20
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 715, 719 (2002).
382. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 278.
383. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, Linking Reputations Through Umbrella Branding 1 (Nov. 4, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative
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industries, as it allows firms “to leverage brand equity” and as such,
“helps firms with strong brands to successfully introduce new products
by convincing consumers that new and existing products are of similar
385
quality.” Therefore, because Losec enjoyed a “solid brand image and
386
reputation” the use of umbrella branding by AstraZeneca helped to
portray the quality of the new generic product and may have contributed
387
to “inertia” by prescribing doctors. Jeanine Miklós-Thal points out,
that as “firms can condition their branding decisions on qualities,
umbrella branding can convey information to consumers even in the
388
absence of any technological quality correlation.”
The effect of umbrella branding is that it creates a “signaling
389
effect” and a “feedback effect,”
arguably fostering a sense of
“loyalty” and “lock-in” effects on the consumer. The implication of the
lock-in effects is that it distorts competition by creating a brand, and by
extension a trade mark, that constitutes a monopoly.
The General Court in its judgment confirmed that
misrepresentations by a dominant company before public authorities,
such as patent offices and national courts, which lead to the grant of an
exclusive right not entitled by an undertaking, or entitled for a shorter
period, “may be particularly restrictive of competition” and may
390
constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102. The General
Court further confirmed that a dominant company cannot use regulatory
procedures to prevent the entry of competitors into the market,
irrespective of its compliance or non-compliance with other legal
391
rules.
The AstraZeneca decision is important for intellectual property
rights, as it demonstrates that the holders of intellectual property rights
can be held liable for violating the competition rules under Article 102.
The decision further provides guidance as to when raising legal barriers
that are capable of delaying or preventing the introduction of generic
Law Review) (citing DAVID A. AAKER, BRAND PORTFOLIO STRATEGY: CREATING RELEVANCE,
DIFFERENTIATION, ENERGY, LEVERAGE, AND CLARITY xiii (2004)). See also Hendrik Hakenes &
Martin Peitz, Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality, 26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 546, 546
(2008).
384. Id. at 24.
385. Id. at 1.
386. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 278.
387. Id. ¶¶ 34, 41.
388. Miklós-Thal, supra note 383, at 2.
389. Id.
390. AstraZeneca, supra note 352, ¶ 355.
391. Id. ¶¶ 656, 677 (stating “[t]he illegality of abusive conduct under Article [102 TFEU] is
unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other legal rules”).
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products or parallel trade will constitute abusive conduct and a breach
of Article 102 of the TFEU.
VI. TRADE MARK MONOPOLIES, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, AND
ANTITRUST LAW
The enactment of antitrust law is seen as a way of curbing and
breaking up monopolies that have significant market share and abuse
their market power. Intellectual property rights confer exclusive rights
392
on their owners. Yet different types of intellectual property pursue
different goals and may produce different effects on the market. For
instance, trade marks and copyrights pursue different goals from each
393
other, and in doing so, they employ different legal mechanisms to
394
reach these goals.
The same can be said of patent law, which
395
promotes innovation.
Professor Mark Lemley has argued that
intellectual property rights are exclusive and indefinite, and as such,
396
they confer market power. This has always been the view of the
courts, and thus an abuse of market power is a violation of antitrust
397
law.
Trade mark protection is not exempt from antitrust law since it is
398
“one of those monopolies,” yet one of the aims of trade mark law is
to protect consumers from confusion and ultimately enhance
399
competition in the market place. The infinite nature of trade mark
protection may affect antitrust law when it prevents competitors from

392. Professor Mark Lemley has argued that
in economic terms, intellectual property rights prevent competition in the sale of a
particular work or invention covered by the intellectual property right, and therefore
allow the intellectual property owner to raise the price of that work above the marginal
cost of reproducing it . . . . In many cases fewer people will buy the work than if it
were distributed on a competitive basis, and they will pay more for the privilege.
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 996 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement].
393. Copyright for example, “allows its owner to exploit ideas once they have been expressed
and recorded in a work, and provides the means for allocating the risks of doing so.” COLSTON &
MIDDLETON, supra note 132, at 279.
394. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 76, at 29.
395. FED. TRADE COMM’N TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003)
396. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 392, at 992.
397. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2.
398. Blanchard, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. at 693 (2 ATK 484–85).
399. See, e.g., H.R. rep. No. 76-944, at 3 (1939), stating that, “[t]he public is thus assured of
identity, and is given an opportunity to choose between competing articles. To protect trademarks, i.e., marks which permit the goods of different makers to be distinguished from each
other, is to promote competition . . .”.
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engaging in any attempt to reproduce a successful mark or packaging
400
design.
Economic theory tells us that public goods are those goods and
services a number of individuals are able to consume without affecting
401
the value of such goods and services. Furthermore, public goods are
not only those goods that are publicly provided by governments, but
402
public goods can also be provided by private means. Most forms of
intellectual property protection are filed by private individuals and
corporations and are provided as a form of ‘public goods.’ The modern
theoretical foundation for other forms of intellectual property rights,
403
such as patents and copyrights, were based on a public goods theory.
As Professor David Barnes points out,
[p]ublic goods analysis is . . . an emerging approach to trademark
law issues. . . . [The] characteristics of public goods mean,
respectively, that information once created can be simultaneously
enjoyed by many people without interfering with the benefits each
derives and that it is difficult to exclude people from enjoying those
404
benefits.

The relevance of the public goods theory is that in relation to trade
mark, public goods inherently contain a normative argument, for
405
example, in relation to antitrust.
The trouble with antitrust is that the concept of market power has
to be properly defined in the law. The Guidance on Article 82 and the
case law of the ECJ state that dominance is when a firm enjoys
406
economic strength. If a firm has a low market share, then that firm
may not run afoul of the antitrust laws in Europe since “low market
shares are generally a good proxy for the absence of substantial market
407
power.”
Furthermore, according to the European Commission,
“experience suggests that dominance is not likely if the undertaking’s
400. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 78, at 21. See also Kurt Borchardt, Are Trademarks an
Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 245, 246 (1943).
401. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 76, at 24.
402. RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
2 (2005).
403. See Barnes, supra note 76, at 22–23.
404. David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2007).
405. A discussion on public goods theory and intellectual property (trademarks) is beyond the
scope of this paper, and is taken up elsewhere; however, see also DINA KALLAY, THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AN AUSTRIAN APPROACH 56
(2004).
406. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 10; See, e.g., United Brands, 1978 E.C.R.
207, ¶ 66.
407. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 14.
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market share is below 40% in the relevant market.”
Recall that
Article 102 of the TFEU and Section 2 of the Sherman Act apply to
dominance or monopoly. The applicability of those two laws is
significant since there are two elements in a monopoly: “[the]
possession of monopoly power [and] the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen
409
or historic accident.”
Thus, the Sherman Act applies to both the possession of a
410
monopoly and to attempts to monopolize. On the other hand, EU case
law has defined dominance as the power “to prevent effective
411
competition being maintained on the relevant market.” Therefore, the
concept of dominance in both the EU and the United States becomes
relevant when a certain degree of economic power is involved. Market
power arises out of the concept of dominance, and the Guidance on
Article 82 states that, “[t]he assessment of whether an undertaking is in
a dominant position and of the degree of market power it holds is a first
412
step in the application of Article 82.” The Guidance on Article 82
adds that “[a]ccording to the case-law, holding a dominant position
confers a special responsibility on the undertaking concerned, the scope
of which must be considered in the light of the specific circumstances of
413
each case” meaning any assessment must be carried out on a case by
case basis.
The Guidance on Article 82 further states that from experience, a
firm that enjoys less than forty percent market share is not in a dominant
414
position.
This approach to the definition of market power (the
Guidance on Article 82 mentions only market share) appears to contain
flaws and “should be evaluated in the context of the alleged
408. Id.
409. See Vickers, supra note 350, at F247 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570–71 (1966)). Vickers further explained the distinction between U.S. and EU Law on
dominance:
Note that in the US, the law is engaged only if there is a causal link from the conduct to
the market power. By contrast, though Article 82 applies only if there is market
power—to the extent of dominance—conduct can be abusive even if it does not
maintain or strengthen that power. So in Europe, but not in the US, pure exploitation of
market power—e.g. excessive pricing—can breach competition law.
Id.
410. Id.
411. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶ 65; see also Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, ¶ 10
(reasoning that abusing a dominant position is a violation of Article 86).
412. Guidance on Article 82, supra note 317, ¶ 9.
413. Id.
414. Id. ¶ 14.
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415

anticompetitive conduct and effect.” By using a threshold to analyze
market power, there is a risk of ignoring other important market
information, such as the ability of competing firms to expand.
The trouble with trade mark protection is that it grants exclusive
416
and absolute power.
These powers are rooted in legal protection,
which serve as an incentive to innovate (though an incentive to invest
might be more appropriate in this context since trade mark law does not
provide any incentive to create new marks). As discussed above, the
present body of work on trade marks generally states that the main
benefit of trade mark protection is that it lowers the consumer’s search
417
cost.
Although this “economic argument for protecting marks is
418
straightforward and quite forceful,” the exclusivity and absoluteness
of trade marks breed monopolies which are inherently in conflict with
419
antitrust law. Strong trade marks then effectively lead to monopoly
profits due to the ability of the trade mark owner to influence the
420
consumer. The monopoly created by trade mark protection and excess
421
market power presents flaws, which are “at odds with social welfare.”
Therefore, the purpose of trade marks should be “simply to help identify
goods accurately to consumers, so that they may obtain the precise
422
price/quality mix they desire.”

415. See Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at
the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 187, 191 (2000) (stating that “[m]arket definition and market
power should be evaluated in the context of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and effect, not as
a flawed filter carried out in a vacuum divorced from these factors.”).
416. See Fletcher, supra note 91, at 323 (citing UPTON, supra note 70, at 10); cf. Marcia B.
Paul & Anthony F. Lo Cicero, Litigating Trademark and Unfair Competition Cases, 463 PLI/Pat
83, 118–19 (delineating four categories of trademark protection from per se exclusive protection,
to conditional protections, to no protection) (1996).
417. See, e.g., Png & Reitman, supra note 122, at 208–11.
418. Carter, supra note 80, at 762.
419. Fletcher, supra note 91, at 323.
420. For similar arguments, see, e.g., Charles E. Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A
Phenomenon Called “Product Differentiation”, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (1968). Cf. 1
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 4:54 (4th ed. 2010)
(explaining why “there is no real conflict . . . between the antitrust laws on the one hand and
trademark laws on the other”). See also Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The
Recent History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 13 (highlighting the current trend of
trademark protection’s and antitrust law’s being “perfectly compatible”).
421. Lunney, Jr., supra note 120, at 373.
422. Id. at 461. Lunney, Jr. concluded by stating that “[b]y creating market power and
anticompetitive losses without offsetting efficiency advantages, property-based trademark
protection fully deserves the label ‘trademark monopoly.’” Id. at 487.

384

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 33:321

423

“Product differentiation
refers to such variations within a
424
product class that some consumers view as imperfect substitutes.”
The economic literature, for instance, tells us that what differentiates
425
products are the characteristics that they each possess. Hence, product
differentiation involves making a particular firm’s product either
426
actually or apparently different from that of its rival. The authors tell
us that “[i]f firms in a particular group produce goods which are
differentiated, the products of the different firms are imperfect
substitutes for each other and . . . this gives each firm the potential” for
427
monopoly profits. This is a result of the fact that “monopoly reduces
the sensitivity to competitive moves that provide firms with the basic
428
incentive to differentiate their product.”
In the general scheme of things, product differentiation occurs
429
when competing goods act as imperfect substitutes for one another.
The argument is that “product differentiation encourages competition by
430
making entry possible,”
as “[t]rademarks, in turn, facilitate the
431
differentiation that facilitates entry.”
According to Clarkson and Miller, the sources of product
differentiation are generally grouped into the following four categories:
1. Differences in quality or design

423. Product differentiation leads to a variety of products being produced. For discussions on
the economic benefits of product differentiation, see, for example, Randall G. Holcombe, Product
Differentiation and Economic Progress, 12 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 17, 17, 26–27 (2009).
424. See Simon P. Anderson, Product Differentiation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 662, 662 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (footnote
not in original).
425. JOHN BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION 4 (1991).
426. Id. at 4–6.
427. Id. at 6.
428. Id. Earlier analysis of monopolistic competition provided a theory of product variety in a
market economy, and this was well documented in EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56–70 (1st ed. 1933); see also JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS
OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 143–54 (1933).
429. This is the general concept that is standard in the economic literature. See, e.g., BEATH
& KATSOULACOS, supra note 425, at 6; JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 368 (2000).
430. Kratzke, supra note 168, at 218 (citing, Yale Brozen, Entry Barriers: Advertising and
Product Differentiation, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 115, (Harvey J.
Goldschmid et al. eds. 1974) and Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377–78 (1977)).
431. Kratzke, supra note 168, at 219, further adding: “[I]f legal rules accord no protection to
trademarks’ product differentiation role, sellers are likely to exit from a market. The law should
recognize as exclusive those trademark interests that facilitate transmission of the informational
and identificatory messages that promote competition by lowering the barrier to entry of
consumers’ lack of information of the advertiser’s product.” Id.
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2. Differences in consumer ignorance regarding essential
characteristics and qualities of the goods purchased (for example,
durable goods that are infrequently purchased and are complex in
design)
3. Brand names, trademarks, or company names derived from sales
promotion activities of sellers, particularly advertising and service
432
4. Differences in the location of sellers of similar goods.

Product differentiation becomes a grey area, with no signs of being
bad or good, when it is integrated into law and economics and its
antitrust implications. On one hand, consumers benefit from the wide
variety of product offerings in order to satisfy their differing
433
preferences. On the other hand, product differentiation can facilitate
the potentially harmful exercise of market power, since “the producer of
a differentiated product often enjoys a localized monopoly and may, in
consequence, be able to charge a higher price than it otherwise
434
could.” The grey area presented by product differentiation does not
necessarily mean that there are no grave antitrust implications. Product
differentiation may encourage price fixing among similar products when
435
monetary transfers are absent. Price fixing or cartels, however, are
still illegal under antitrust law, and would fall under Section 2 of the
436
Sherman Act or Article 102 of the TFEU.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated (or attempted to demonstrate) that
the distinctiveness requirement in trade mark registration is a core
principle that paves the way for trade marks to become monopolies.
This article has further argued that trade mark protection is a form of
monopoly, given that the property rights in trade marks are “exclusive

432. KENNETH W. CLARKSON & ROGER LEROY MILLER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION:
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 168 (1982).
433. Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust
Policy Issues, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 177, 179 (1997).
434. Id. See also Ulf Bernitz, Brand Differentiation Between Identical Products: An Analysis
From a Consumer Law Viewpoint, 5 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 21, 21 (1981) (discussing brand
differentiation as a problem of antitrust law).
435. For more on product differentiation, see Philippe Jehiel, Product Differentiation and
Price Collusion, 10 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 633, 634 (1992). The relationship between product
differentiation and the ability of firms to collude has been expounded upon in both the legal and
economics literature. See, e.g., Myong-Hun Chang, The Effects of Product Differentiation on
Collusive Pricing, 9 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 453, 453 (1991); Qihong Liu & Konstantinos Serfes,
Market Segmentation and Collusive Behavior, 25 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 355, 358 (2007).
436. Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 46, § 2; TFEU, supra note 19, art. 102.

386

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.
437

[Vol. 33:321

and absolute.” Although laws regulate monopolies in order to protect
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the interest of the consumer, the behavioral patterns of consumers
towards a product may enable the product to sustain its monopoly since
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only consumer demands increase the value of the product.
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